

Women's Work after War

Meredith A. Kleykamp ¹

University of Kansas
Department of Sociology
1415 Jayhawk Blvd.
716 Fraser Hall
Lawrence, KS 66045
kleykamp@ku.edu

March 30, 2009

¹Extended Abstract for the 2009 annual meeting of the Population Association of America meetings. DRAFT VERSION—DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION.

Abstract

In the more than 30 years following the all-volunteer force (AVF) the proportion of women serving in the military has increased from 1.8% just before the AVF to 14.2% in 2008. The majority of women do not stay in the military for a 20 or more year career; like men, most women only serve a few years before transitioning to the civilian workforce. Although the fraction of the military who are women has risen as has the fraction of veterans who are women, little research informs how female veterans of the AVF fare economically after leaving service or whether military service benefits minority women who serve in such disproportionate numbers. This paper investigates the civilian employment experiences of female veterans of the AVF using two sources of data. First, population-based data from the decennial Census and the American Community Survey are used to evaluate the employment experiences of female veterans. Second, data from an audit study of civilian hiring practices provides additional insight into the experiences of women veterans transitioning from military to civilian work.

Introduction

In the more than 30 years following the all-volunteer force (AVF) the proportion of women serving in the military has increased from 1.8% just before the AVF to 14.2% in 2008. At the same time, the fraction of the women serving who are black has risen dramatically. Now, more than 33% of the women in the military and more than 42% of those in the Army are black. Yet most of these women do not stay in the military for a 20 or more year career; like men, most women only serve a few years before transitioning to the civilian workforce. Although female representation in the ranks of the military has continued to rise, little research informs how female veterans of the AVF fare economically after leaving service or whether military service benefits minority women who serve in such disproportionate numbers.

Women who serve in the military are non-traditional on two fronts: they have work experience in a non-traditional occupation, and that occupational experience, regardless of gender, is increasingly rare. Only a fraction of the population has ever served in the military making veterans a relatively small, and shrinking social group. Because the military has been and still is disproportionately male, female veterans are even more unique. Does their unique status lead to advantageous or disadvantageous labor market outcomes? This paper investigates several related questions. First, how do employment and earnings of female veterans compare with non-veterans? Does this vary by race? Has this changed over the past 30 years, as more women serve in the military and transition into the labor force as veterans? And importantly, what may explain veteran/non-veteran differences among women?

Returns to Military Service: Theory

Several theoretical perspectives offer explanations for why military service influences labor market outcomes: human capital theory, social and cultural capital theories, status attainment theory, and lifecourse theory. Most prior research invokes one or more of these perspectives to explain veteran/non-veteran differences in earnings or employment.

Human Capital

Human capital theory explains differences in employment or earnings as the result of differences in productivity-enhancing investments in education and training that enhance productivity. This theory generates two contrasting hypotheses about military service (Becker 1993; Mincer 1974). First, military service provides skills and training in particular occupational specialties, thus individuals use military service as a means of building human capital. Veterans may gain an employment advantage from the specialized, on-the-job training they receive, especially in non-combat support occupations (Angrist 1993; Mangum and Ball 1987; Mangum and Ball 1989). Veterans may also gain other more general skills and experience valued by civilian employers such as leadership or supervisory skills not often found among

similar non-veterans. Military service also enables higher educational attainment through the GI Bill, thereby also increasing human capital endowments among veterans (Angrist 1993; Cohen, Warner, and Segal 1995; Fligstein 1976; Teachman and Call 1996). Increases in human capital from experience, training, and education attributed to military service are expected lead to higher employment rates and earnings than non-veterans.

Alternately, the human capital perspective suggests that increases in military-specific human capital are a risky investment in productivity because they are earned at the expense of civilian work experience or investments in higher education (Angrist 1998; Bryant and Wilhite 1990; Bryant, Samaranayake, and Wilhite 1993). Although military training increases human capital, skills gained may have little application in the civilian world (Barley 1998). Thus, time spent in the military may be less valuable than time spent in the civilian labor market. If so, military veterans are expected to show lower employment rates and earnings than their non-serving peers who accumulated more years of relevant work experience. Teachman (2004) finds that Vietnam era draftees were especially vulnerable to negative effects of service on human capital in that the typical draftee served 2 years—long enough to lose valuable civilian experience, but too short a time to gain any compensatory skills training. GI Bill benefits facilitate higher educational attainment, but military service may interrupt the timing of higher education, dissuading individuals from pursuing a college degree. Veterans may choose to make investments in human capital through military training rather than higher education (Cohen, Segal, and Temme 1986a; 1986b; MacLean 2005; MacLean 2004).

The consequences of changes in human capital induced by military service may vary by race, a key assertion from the bridging perspective offered by Browning et al. (1973), or by gender. To the extent that discrimination in the labor market channels women and minorities into jobs that offer little training, or detracts from their gainful employment, military service advantages human capital formation by providing an ostensibly race- and gender-neutral environment where both majority and minority have equal opportunity to build skills and experience (Moskos and Butler 1996; Segal, Bachman, and Dowdell 1978). Military service may also substitute for formal schooling for some groups, or provide a form of financing for later educational investments that pay off in the civilian labor market (Heller 1997; Heller 1999; Paulsen and St. John 2002).

Social and Cultural Capital

Social capital (Coleman 1988; Portes 2000) and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986; Lamont and Lareau 1988) theories offer insight into the ways military service may alter social and cultural resources as opposed to economic or human-capital endowments. By changing an individual's ideology, work habits, attitudes and behaviors, and social networks, military service makes veterans more attractive to employers (Browning, Lopreato, and Poston 1973; Lopreato and Poston 1977; Xie 1992). Seen from the cultural capital perspective, military service offers a kind of social training to groups who might not gain such skills outside mil-

itary service. This social training comes from daily interaction with, supervision of and by members of the “dominant” group. Women learn to work successfully alongside men, in many cases outranking them owing to the rigid rank structure of the military. Women may develop a specific kind of social capital that allows them better access to employment in non-traditional occupations.

A social capital perspective also suggests part of the influence of military service may be in the removal of individuals from social networks, neighborhoods and environments that discourage economic success. Those who benefit most are likely to be racial and ethnic minorities or socioeconomically disadvantaged whites who may have resource-poor social networks (Elder 1986; Sampson and Laub 1996; Xie 1992). Social capital theory suggests military service may act as a critical turning point by “knifing off” past social ties to people and places that might constrain their economic success. By conferring social and cultural advantages, military service is expected to produce positive consequences for employment and earnings, especially among the less advantaged.

Status Attainment and Life Course

Both the status attainment and life course perspectives characterizes individual social mobility as a path from family socioeconomic origins to adult socioeconomic attainment which is moderated by various ascriptive characteristics, social psychological aspirations and achieved statuses (Blau and Duncan 1967; Duncan and Hodge 1963; Featherman and Hauser 1978). Under this logic, military service operates as a contingent event altering the basic status attainment process (Browning, Lopreato, and Poston 1973; Lopreato and Poston 1977; Teachman 2004; Teachman and Tedrow 2004) As a contingent event, military service potentially reduces the negative consequences of a disadvantaged background.

The lifecourse perspective sees military service as a disruption to the normative path through a series of age-stratified institutions such as school and the labor market. Military service disrupts the normative timing and sequencing of participation in these institutions, potentially disadvantaging those who elect to enlist rather than follow the expected trajectory (Angrist 1998; Elder 1986; Hogan and Astone 1986; MacLean 2005). Under the status attainment model, military service disrupts or alters the usual stratification process, whereas a lifecourse view suggests military service disrupts age-graded institutional affiliations. Research identifying military service as a “turning point” in the lives of young men straddles the lifecourse and status attainment views (Elder 1986; Laub and Sampson 1993; Sampson and Laub 1996).

For women, military service may conflict with the other gender-normative lifecourse activities related to family formation and childbearing. Segal (1986) eloquently showed that military service and family are both greedy institutions, and that the intensive demands of each pit these two institutional roles against each other. Thus military women often make the choice to sacrifice a military work role for marriage and childbearing. Female veterans

may find the civilian labor force a more flexible alternative than continued military service.

Prior Research on Female Veterans: Empirical Findings

While research on the consequences of military service among women is sparse, a few studies have addressed the post-service economic outcomes among female veterans. Using 1990 Census data, Prokos and Padovic (2000) found female veterans earned less than their non-veterans peers after controlling for demographic and human capital differences. They did find evidence of a veteran premium among older, pre-AVF veterans, suggesting military service among “trailblazing” women was relatively advantageous at a time when fewer non-veterans were working, particularly in male-dominated occupations. Cooney et al.(2003) also used 1990 Census data, finding that there was no advantage to military service among black women; they showed similar incomes to their non-veteran peers. White women veterans appeared disadvantaged relative to comparable non-veterans. Cooney et al. conceive of these effects as not a reflection of the effect of military service, but as indications of the different relative opportunity structures for non-serving black and white women. If the civilian opportunities for black women are more limited than those for white women, then black veterans may appear more advantaged relative to non-veterans than white veterans relative to white non-veterans.

Mehay and Hirsch use a unique data set to examine the effect of active military service among a group of women reservists. Using this data they are able to better control for the selectivity of female veterans. Women veterans may have some unobserved characteristic that both makes them more likely to be a veteran and to have high earnings—in the absence of military service, these women would still be expected to show higher earnings due to this unmeasured attribute (such a motivation, ability, etc...). They found a 9% wage penalty among all female veterans, with a 12% penalty among whites and a 2% penalty among black female veterans relative to their non-veterans peers.

Data and Methods

This paper employs two sources of data. Decennial Census data and data from the American Community Survey are used to examine the employment patterns of female veterans and non-veterans. Results of an experimental, audit study of civilian hiring are compared against the Census results.

Census Data

I use the IPUMS 5% sample from the 1990, and 2000 Census to identify a large number of female veterans for study (Ruggles et al. 2008). The samples consist of all women age 17-35 reporting any current or former military service, which provides X female veterans over the

two periods. The full female veteran sample is augmented by a random sample of female non-veterans of a similar size, resulting in X female non-veterans. Owing to the different probabilities of selection into the current sample for veterans and non-veterans, probability weights combining the Census probability of selection from the population with the probability of selection from the IPUMS 5% sample are used for all analyses.¹

Analyses are limited to those women at risk of any military service in the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) which officially began in 1973. Thus, in 1990, only those women age 19-34 could have served a minimum 2-year commitment in the AVF² In 2000, women age 19-44 could have been AVF veterans. Because of the difference in maximum age of an AVF veteran in 1990 and 2000, I limit the analysis to women under 35 in both years.

Military service, and thus, veteran status is non-randomly determined. The Census does not include measures such as Armed Forces qualifying Test (AFQT) that would help account for the observable selectivity of female veterans. Because nearly all women serving in the AVF have a high school diploma, analysis is limited to those women with a diploma or GED to make the veteran and non-veteran sample less differentially selective on education. Further controls for the selectivity of military service on either observable or unobservable characteristics are not included in the analysis of Census data. However, by using an experimental approach (described below) I can eliminate the influence of selection to evaluate the impact of military experience on the initial stages of hiring.

ACS 2005-2007 Data

TO BE ADDED BY PRESENTATION

I also use data from the 2005-2007 three-year combined American Community Survey (ACS) microdata, which provide the most up-to-date national level data with enough observations for analysis. The current ACS data better contextualizes the experimental data described below. The ACS data analysis will mirror the descriptive results presented for the 1990 and 2000 Census data below.

The Audit Data

Another source of data in this paper comes from an experimental study of civilian hiring wherein resumes of fictitious job applicants showing equivalent work experience are sent in response to advertised job openings. These fictitious applicants differ in the presentation of characteristics of interest to the research, in this case one applicant has gained work experience while serving in the military. Specifically, the experimental design matches three

¹If p_1 is the probability of selection into the Census sample, and p_2 is the probability of selection from the Census sample to the non-veteran sub-sample, then $\frac{1}{p_1}$ is the Census weight, and $\frac{1}{p_2}$ if the non-veteran weight. The overall sampling weight then is $\frac{1}{(p_1 \times p_2)}$.

²The official definition of veteran for Census purposes is one who served at least 2 years on active duty.

applicants, one of whom has recently left the active duty Army, after a period of four years of service as a personnel specialist (equivalent to a human resources clerk.) She is matched with two individuals with only civilian work experience as human resource clerks. One of the non-veterans has a high school diploma, while the other is a recent graduate of a local four-year, non-competitive college. The veteran applicant is matched with two civilian peers to assess the effect of military service holding education constant and an assessment of the claim that military training may substitute for a college education.

Applicant work histories and personal characteristics are chosen to represent the factors of interest to the study (military experience, race/ethnicity, sex and education). Veteran status is indicated by a work history showing a sequence of typical jobs in the Army and by an indicator on the resume of an honorable discharge from service after four years (a typical service obligation). Veteran resumes indicate a period of service in Iraq. Veteran applicants present a high school diploma and some college credits, as well as specific military vocational training relevant to their specialty (for example a 6-week course on the military personnel system for an individual who worked as a personnel clerk in the military). Because a typical veteran serving 4 years would have been promoted at least once into a job with more responsibility, civilian resumes reflect a similar pattern of increased responsibility within a single occupation.

By matching applicants on observable characteristics related to productivity typically found in resumes including work experience, and age, and by allocating socioeconomically and racially similar neighborhoods of current residence and high school, the experiment isolates differences in treatment to employer evaluation of that which does differ across applicants, namely prior military service. Fictitious identities are created for each applicant in a testing team including name, phone number (linked only to a voicemail box) email address, and postal address. The choice of name is vital in that the race is conveyed to employers based solely on the use of racially distinct name. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) established the salience of racially distinctive names in hiring, although Levitt and Fryer (2004) criticized the study on the basis that racially distinctive names also conveyed information about class background. Their critique is less consequential for the proposed design, because there is not a direct test of the influence of applicant race on hiring. Primary interest is on the within-race treatment of veterans, with tests evaluating whether the veteran /nonveteran difference is greater among blacks or whites. The names and visual layout (font and formatting) of each resume will be varied to control for any employer preference for resume layout or name.

Evidence of differential treatment of military and civilian applicants comes from measuring whether employers call back applicants with military experience (to researcher-maintained voicemail accounts) more or less often than their civilian matched peers. Differences in callback rates between veterans and non-veterans indicate differential treatment at the initial stages of hiring only. While measuring callbacks is not the same as measuring actual em-

ployment offers, the interview decision screens out the vast majority of applicants early on and operates as a gateway to employment. Prior research suggests that the interview stage is when the most discriminatory behavior in hiring occurs (Mincy 1993). In a study of age discrimination, 76% of the differential treatment overall occurred at the callback stage (Bendick, Brown, and Wall 1999). Results may thus understate the extent of differential treatment if differential treatment is cumulative over the application to offer process (Mincy 1993). Each race-resume type cell is allocated a separate voicemail box. A similar outgoing message is recorded on each mailbox. Similarly, email accounts are established for each race-resume type cell.

Results

Census and ACS data: Thick Description

Table 1 below reports key descriptive statistics of interest for female veterans and non-veterans for key groups of women, in the 1990 and 2000 Census data.

Tables 2 and 3 present coefficients for logistic regressions modeling employment. Table 2 presents separate models by veterans status, while Table 3 presents results from a pooled model interacting veteran status with several key predictors to assess whether the effect of these variables of interest differs by veteran status.

NEED ACS results.


NEED text presentation of Census regressions results

Audit Results

Figure 1 presents the weekly count of job ads identified by the research team for testing. The count reflects all advertisements (not a sample) for positions that do not require certification, college education, licensing, or an other formal credential or skill made explicit in the job ad. The ad also must provide a fax number where resumes can be sent in response to the ad. We conducted tests over the period from June to August, and from November to March. The decline in the employment situation in this labor market is evident, with the count of relevant ads dropping from 80 per week down to under five per week by the end of the study period. Thus, our study reflects the treatment of veterans in the hiring process under difficult hiring conditions.

Analysis of the audit data is relatively straightforward, focusing on the percent of resumes generating a callback from an employer, by test condition (military, high school, or college graduate). Tests were conducted for both white and black “teams”. Figure 2 reflects the callback rates for each condition, by race. The white team tested 306 employers, while the black team tested 294 employers (differences owing to random variation in invalid fax numbers across the ads, which were randomly assigned to race teams). Among the white team, 7.4% of the military resumes elicited a callback, whereas only 4.8% of the high school grad-

Figure 1: Number of job ads identified for testing by week)




uate and 3.4% of the college graduate resumes (with equivalent work experience) received callbacks. Among the black team results were much the same with 7.5% of the military resumes garnering a callback compared with 5.6% of the high school graduate and 4.0% of the college graduate resumes getting an employer response.

Our experiment uses matched triples, thus the Cochran’s Q statistic (the extension of the McNemar test to n-tuples) evaluates whether there is equal treatment across the three matched conditions. In both the black and white team data, the Cochran’s Q rejects the null hypothesis of equal treatment across the three conditions (Q_{black} test, $p < 0.0001$, Q_{white} test, $p < 0.0001$). Given overall evidence of unequal treatment, interest lies in whether each pairwise contrast shows evidence of equal or unequal treatment. Figure 2 suggests a hierarchy of employer preference for female job seekers, with military veterans at the top, high school graduates following, and recent college graduates at the bottom.

We use a logistic regression to model whether or not a submitted resume elicited a callback, including dummy variables for test condition, the order in which each condition was sent (was the military, high school or college resume sent first) and date as predictors. We include date to capture the secular decline in job prospects that may influence employer selectivity in calling back applicants. Following Pager, Western and Bonaikowski (forthcoming) who extend the results from Ghosh, Chen, Ghosh, and Agresti (2000) we use a random effects specification with an employer random effect, which “allows information about all

Figure 2: Callback Rates of Veterans, and Non-Veteran High School and College Graduates by Race



three testers to contribute to inference about a contrast between any two” (p.14) The random effect model extends work on matched pairs to use within-triplet comparisons to account for the correlation between observations in the matched triplet.³

Tables 4 and 5 summarize the regression results. For both the black and white teams, the veteran-college graduate contrast is statistically significant, but neither the veteran-high school, nor the high school-college contrast are significant at traditional levels. The finding that employers are *least* likely to callback the college graduate is surprising. Both the veteran and the high school graduate present evidence of some college credits, and all show functionally equivalent work experience, job stability patterns and tenures in all jobs reflected on the resumes. We attribute this result to employers possibly evaluating these applicants as overqualified, or not being seriously interested in the position. Even if there were slight differences in the format of the college resume that did not appeal to employers, we would not expect such presentational matters to present such a large effects on callbacks.

Discussion

Veteran advantage in employment, labor force participation, and in hiring as suggested by audit data. Why the differences—compositional influences, sector of employment audit limited to private sector where no explicit veteran preference. Public sector work has formal veteran preference in hiring.

³Similar results are obtained if we use a simple logistic regression model, adjusting the standard errors for clustering within employers using the Sandwich estimator.

Selection of female veterans into family formation, childbearing and how that differs from non-veterans? Work in non-traditional occupations.

Audit data demands employer interviews to understand MECHANISMS behind employer behaviors in hiring women veterans and aversion to recent college graduates. These are in the works.

Table 1: Descriptive Results from 1990 and 2000 Census

	2000								
	Current Military			Veteran			No Military Service		
	White	Black	Hispanic	White	Black	Hispanic	White	Black	Hispanic
Earnings (\$/hr.)	12.14	12.75	10.91	15.51	15.27	14.52	14.73	14.45	14.06
Age	27.94	28.04	25.93	35.61	35.13	33.7	32.48	32.18	31.2
Potential experience	9.12	9.71	7.74	16.68	15.05	14.78	13.46	13.6	12.73
Public sector	100.0	100.0	100.0	25.2	35.6	32.3	16.0	23.7	18.4
% Male in Occ.	63.3	59.6	63.2	39.5	37.9	37.9	33.7	33.2	32.6
# Children	0.59	0.73	0.56	1.12	1.15	1.07	0.96	1.19	1.12
FTYR	77.8	70.0	63.3	68.0	69.8	61.9	58.5	60.7	53.5
South	5.7	5.6	3.4	5.8	8.1	1.4	6.4	9.3	0.4
HS/GED	22.7	26.9	30.2	20.3	20.0	22.5	26.3	32.2	35.7
Some College	52.4	59.7	59.0	52.6	58.6	57.4	40.6	45.2	43.2
4-yr. degree	15.7	9.6	7.2	19.3	15.9	14.0	24.5	16.6	16.2
Graduate School	9.2	3.7	3.5	7.7	5.5	6.1	8.5	6.0	4.9
Married	38.0	45.1	46.9	18.1	28.3	22.7	30.1	48.8	32.5
Previously married	46.6	37.6	42.0	55.2	40.0	52.5	56.4	36.0	52.0
Never married	15.4	17.3	11.1	26.6	31.8	24.9	13.5	15.2	15.5
Unweighted N	3195	1914	689	13558	4362	1175	17100	2490	1836
	1990								
	Current Military			Veteran			No Military Service		
	White	Black	Hispanic	White	Black	Hispanic	White	Black	Hispanic
Earnings (\$/hr.)	10.87	10.81	9.98	13.54	13.38	12.7	13.19	12.89	13.09
Age	27.2	26.55	27.06	32.87	31.74	32.01	31.62	31.78	30.49
Potential experience	8.63	8.39	7.9	14.08	13.24	12.44	12.84	13.39	12.1
Public sector	100.0	100.0	100.0	29.7	41.4	38.9	17.6	28.8	19.2
% Male in Occ.	60.3	57.5	55.8	39.0	37.6	36.4	33.1	31.2	30.8
# Children	0.49	0.57	0.57	0.95	1.05	0.99	0.9	1.11	1.02
FTYR	75.5	68.8	71.2	63.1	63.9	65.0	55.8	60.6	55.3
South	4.9	7.2	3.6	4.8	8.4	1.6	6.0	9.9	0.3
HS/GED	30.3	32.7	37.0	26.0	26.1	29.9	33.0	36.8	38.1
Some College	47.4	54.7	49.4	49.2	56.3	52.5	39.3	45.1	43.6
4-yr. degree	15.8	10.6	11.2	17.2	12.9	12.5	20.2	12.4	13.2
Graduate School	6.5	2.0	2.3	7.6	4.8	5.1	7.5	5.6	5.1
Married	38.7	47.7	38.8	19.7	28.1	20.5	29.1	41.6	31.1
Previously married	46.2	35.4	45.1	57.0	43.4	53.3	57.2	35.9	55.1
Never married	15.1	16.9	16.0	23.3	28.4	26.2	13.7	22.5	13.7
Unweighted N	5041	2146	475	11682	2356	732	12517	1512	870

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results Predicting Employment, by Veteran Status

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1990		2000	
	Veteran	Non-veteran	Veteran	Non-veteran
Black	0.860*** (0.049)	0.746*** (0.053)	0.855*** (0.050)	0.826*** (0.050)
Hispanic	0.941 (0.089)	0.722*** (0.059)	0.823** (0.069)	0.624*** (0.036)
Potential Experience	1.139*** (0.034)	1.262*** (0.027)	1.177*** (0.040)	1.236*** (0.022)
Experience ²	0.995*** (0.0015)	0.990*** (0.0012)	0.994*** (0.0016)	0.991*** (0.00099)
Some College	1.312*** (0.062)	1.333*** (0.065)	1.050 (0.061)	1.464*** (0.064)
4-Yr. Degree	1.683*** (0.13)	2.083*** (0.15)	1.572*** (0.14)	2.454*** (0.15)
Graduate	2.470*** (0.39)	4.941*** (0.84)	1.873*** (0.27)	3.571*** (0.39)
South residence	0.993 (0.097)	0.888 (0.080)	0.905 (0.085)	0.923 (0.070)
Previously Married	0.882* (0.057)	1.083 (0.069)	0.578*** (0.039)	0.788*** (0.039)
Never Married	1.044 (0.078)	1.219** (0.11)	0.863* (0.068)	1.101 (0.089)
# Children	0.794*** (0.021)	0.715*** (0.021)	0.907*** (0.026)	0.865*** (0.024)
Child < 6?	0.575*** (0.032)	0.472*** (0.029)	0.697*** (0.042)	0.603*** (0.033)
N	13577	13658	11283	18104
Pseudo R^2	0.0495	0.0792	0.0351	0.0552

Sample excludes current military, all of whom are considered employed.

Reference group: White, non-veteran, non-South residence, never married, no child under 6.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 3: Logistic Regression Results predicting Employment, Veteran interactions

Odds Ratio	(1) 1990	(2) 2000
Veteran	1.494** (0.24)	1.509** (0.27)
Black	0.746*** (0.053)	0.826*** (0.050)
Hispanic	0.722*** (0.059)	0.624*** (0.036)
Black \times Veteran	1.158 (0.11)	1.035 (0.086)
Hispanic \times Veteran	1.299** (0.16)	1.320*** (0.13)
Potential Experience	1.262*** (0.027)	1.236*** (0.022)
Experience \times Veteran	0.902*** (0.033)	0.952 (0.036)
Potential Experience ²	0.990*** (0.0012)	0.991*** (0.00099)
Experience ² \times Veteran	1.005** (0.0019)	1.003* (0.0019)
Some College	1.334*** (0.065)	1.464*** (0.064)
Some College \times Veteran	0.985 (0.067)	0.718*** (0.052)
4-Year College	2.083*** (0.15)	2.454*** (0.15)
4-Year College \times Veteran	0.808** (0.086)	0.641*** (0.068)
Graduate-level Education	4.941*** (0.84)	3.571*** (0.39)
Graduate-level \times Veteran	0.500*** (0.12)	0.525*** (0.094)
Lives in south	0.888 (0.079)	0.923 (0.070)
Married	1.083 (0.069)	0.788*** (0.039)
Married \times Veteran	0.816** (0.074)	0.733*** (0.061)
Divorced, Separated, Widowed	1.219** (0.11)	1.101 (0.089)
Divorce \times Veteran	0.858 (0.10)	0.784** (0.089)
Number of children	0.715*** (0.021)	0.865*** (0.024)
Number Children \times Veteran	1.111*** (0.044)	1.049 (0.041)
Has child under 6?	0.472*** (0.029)	0.603*** (0.033)
Child under 6 \times Veteran	1.216** (0.10)	1.156* (0.094)
Constant	1.243*** (0.10)	1.123* (0.077)
Observations	27235	29387
R^2	.	.
Pseudo R^2	0.0789	0.0550

Sample excludes current military, all of whom are considered employed.

Reference group: White, non-veteran, non-South residence, never married, no child under 6.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$

Table 4: Random effects model of callback: White

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : callback	
College Graduate	-1.444* (0.575)
HS Graduate	-0.750 (0.512)
Sent 2nd	0.008 (0.401)
Sent 3rd	-0.284 (0.544)
date	-0.004 (0.004)
Intercept	59.601 (76.383)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u	
Intercept	2.154** (0.312)
N	
	918
Log-likelihood	
	-156.929
$\chi^2_{(5)}$	
	9.044
Reference is Veterans, sent 1st	

Table 5: Random effects model of callback: Black

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : callback	
College Graduate	-1.266* (0.546)
HS Graduate	-0.611 (0.502)
Sent 2nd	0.803 (0.543)
Sent 3rd	0.450 (0.545)
date	-0.008 [†] (0.005)
Intercept	141.947 [†] (83.190)
Equation 2 : lnsig2u	
Intercept	2.680** (0.200)
N	882
Log-likelihood	-143.652
$\chi^2_{(5)}$	10.226
Reference is Veterans, sent 1st	