The Intergenerational Economic Incorporation of European Immigrants in Canada, 1970-2000: Is Straight-Line Assimilation Uniform by Ethnicity?

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we consider the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants in Canada, keeping an eye on ethnicity. Specifically, we examine ethnic differences in (1) the annual earnings of the first generation, relative to those of the mainstream; (2) the shift in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations; and (3) their determinants. Data from the 1971 and 2001 census are analyzed by means of a "lagged generation model," enabling us to study this longitudinal process from cross-sectional data. Our results challenge the notion that straight-line assimilation characterizes Europeanorigin groups uniformly. Typically, the second generation experiences upward mobility in relative annual earnings over the first generation, consistent with straight-line assimilation. However, the magnitude and mechanisms of intergenerational economic incorporation depend on ethnicity. For some European-origin groups, generational succession does not produce upward mobility in relative annual earnings, meaning that "bumpy-line assimilation" may characterize their intergenerational economic incorporation.

INTRODUCTION

Straight-line assimilation has long been used to characterize the incorporation of immigrants into the mainstream of the receiving society. Based on the experiences of European-origin groups in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, it portrays immigrant incorporation as an intergenerational process in which cultural and socio-economic assimilation go hand-in-hand. Each generation further removed from the experience of immigration becomes more similar to the mainstream in culture. This enables successive generations of immigrants to increasingly improve their social and economic status vis-à-vis predecessors, such that, by the second or third generation, they are virtually indistinguishable from the mainstream.

Straight-line assimilation has acquired an iconic status in the fields of immigration and race/ethnicity. Indeed, scholars focusing on "new" immigrants in United States, originating from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean since 1965, have used it in association with European immigrants as a benchmark against which to evaluate the success of the former in becoming incorporated into the mainstream with the passage of generations (DeWind & Kasinitz, 1997; Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997; Waldinger, 2007; Waters & Jiménez, 2005). In recent years, however, other scholars have challenged the uniformity of straight-line assimilation, in terms of generation and ethnicity, among the European immigrants on whom it is based. Gans (1992a) has suggested that a "bumpy-line" label is more appropriate than a straight-line label for describing their assimilation, as not every generation manages to move ahead of its predecessors, even if generational succession generally leads toward convergence with the mainstream. And a number of scholars have provided evidence of ethnic differences in the extent of upward mobility between generations of European immigrants in North America.

In this paper, we consider one aspect of European-origin groups' experiences of assimilation in Canada: their intergenerational economic incorporation into the mainstream in the period following the Second World War. Specifically, we examine the shift in relative annual earnings between European immigrants (the first generation) and what could be their native-born children (the second generation). This research is guided by three questions. First, to what extent is the first generation disadvantaged relative to the mainstream in terms of annual earnings? Second, does the second generation experience upward mobility in relative annual earnings over the first generation and, if so, is it sufficient to overcome the relative disadvantage of the first generation? And third, what role do employment and human-capital characteristics play in the relative disadvantage of the first generation and in the improvement between the first and second generations in relative annual earnings? As the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants may differ by ethnicity, we distinguish between origin groups in addressing these questions.

In Canada, researchers interested in the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants have been thwarted by limitations of both data and methods. The question of respondent's birthplace has always been included in the census, allowing the foreign-born to be distinguished from the native-born. However, the question on the birthplace of the respondent's parents was dropped from the census between 1901 and 1966, making it impossible

to disaggregate the second generation from subsequent generations of native-born immigrants. This question reappeared in the 1971 census, and again in the 2001 census. Yet, these data are cross-sectional. Inferring the economic incorporation of immigrants across generations that are conceptualized as related by kinship is challenging on the basis of conventional techniques, as it is a longitudinal process. Myers and his colleagues (2006) have used the "lagged generation model" to measure the intergenerational incorporation of immigrants from cross-sectional data. Employing this technique, we take advantage of information of respondent's birthplace and the birthplace of his/her parents in the 1971 and 2001 census to study the economic incorporation of European immigrants in Canada, with the passage generations.

STRAIGHT-LINE ASSIMILATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Since the mid-1960s, the origins of immigrant flows to North America have shifted away from Europe to Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Accordingly, recent research on the economic incorporation of immigrants across generations has focused on the children of these "new" immigrants. There is widespread concern among scholars about their prospects for successful incorporation in the host economy (e.g., Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997). The reasons for concern are threefold. First, the new second generation is visibly identifiable in a labor market not yet cured of racial prejudice and discrimination (Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997). Second, it enters an "hourglass" economy that offers few opportunities for upward mobility in the absence of significant educational achievements than was the case in earlier decades (Bean & Stevens, 2003). Third, low-skilled immigrants converge in urban areas characterized by poverty, where their children are exposed to the "oppositional culture" of a native-born underclass that imperils academic success (Zhou, 1997). In light of these barriers to economic incorporation faced by the new second generation, why is it important to consider the experiences of Europeans?

At issue in current research is whether the new second generation will parallel or diverge from their European forerunners in how they fit into the economy of the receiving society, given the barriers identified above (Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997). The notion of "straight-line assimilation" was developed in reference to the experiences of European-origin groups, particularly Eastern and Southern Europeans, in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century (Gans, 1992a; Portes & Böröcz, 1989). It portrays immigrant incorporation as an inevitable and irreversible process of cultural assimilation in the form of Anglo-conformity,

leading to social and economic incorporation (Alba & Nee, 1997). This process unfolds over the course of several generations. In fact, generations are its motor. Each generation further removed from the experience of immigration becomes more similar to the mainstream in culture, including human-capital endowments, giving them progressively more equitable access to the opportunity structure of the receiving society (Zhou, 1997). In this way, successive generations of immigrants improve their relative socio-economic status vis-à-vis predecessors. After two or three generations in the receiving society, the descendants of immigrants are virtually indistinguishable the mainstream (Boyd & Grieco, 1998; Borjas, 1993).

Scholars note that straight-line assimilation is an oversimplified rendition of the experiences of European-origin groups (e.g., Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997). They have provided historical examples of the challenges faced by these immigrants and their children in becoming incorporated into the American mainstream. In the contemporary context, race refers to color, but, a century ago, differences in phenotypic characteristics, such as skin hue and facial features, were considered to be indicative of innate differences in mental abilities and character traits (Foner, 2005). "White ethnics," including Italians, Poles, and Jews, were seen as racially different from—and inferior to—individuals with origins in Northern and Western Europe (Alba & Nee, 2003; Foner, 2005; Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997). For this reason, they became targets of nativist hostility, based on concerns that they were ultimately unassimilable (Alba & Nee, 2003). Further, discrimination against them was open and largely legal (Foner, 2005). For example, Perlmann and Waldiner (1997) point out that, in the 1920s, many prestigious universities adopted measures to restrict the enrollment of Russian Jews. The possibility of postsecondary education eluded many working-class Italian boys in the 1920s and 1930s, as their cynicism and hostility toward school and teachers translated to elevated dropout rates by highschool years (Foner, 2005; Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997). Rather than making a beeline for work in factories, these youths spent their time on the street corner, hanging around, drinking liquor, and getting into fights (Perlmann & Waldinger, 1997).

While these historical examples suggest that each and every generation of European immigrants does not necessary move progressively forward, Gans (1992a & b) understands them as "bumps" in a generational dynamic that proceeds in the general direction of socio-economic assimilation. Indeed, European-origin groups in the North America have made considerable progress during the 20th century. In the "twilight" of European ethnicity, studies reveal relatively

minor differences in socio-economic status by national origin. And they show that the current rank ordering of European-origin groups by well-being is generally unrelated to that at the turn of the century (see Alba et al., 2001; Darroch, 1979; Lautard & Lorlee, 1984; Lieberson & Waters, 1988; Niedert & Farley, 1985; Pineo, 1976; Pineo & Porter, 1985).

Yet, as Perlmann and Waldinger (1997: 898) point out: "convergence today' need not contradict '[ethnic] differences [that] lasted as long as a century." A number of scholars have challenged the notion that the process of assimilation takes two or three generations for completion, in form of the transformation of diverse national-origin groups into a homogenous population. Looking at a variety of European and "new" immigrant groups in the United States from 1940 to 1970, Borjas (1993) has examined intergenerational mobility in relative earnings. He finds that economic differences between immigrant groups are transmitted to their children, so that the heterogeneity found among today's immigrants becomes the heterogeneity found among tomorrow's ethnic groups. In another article Borjas (2006) estimates that about half of the differences in relative economic status persists from one generation to the next. Going back further in time, he has examined the evolution of ethnic differences in human capital among European-origin groups since 1910 (Borjas, 1994). He claims that ethnic inequalities in human capital among European immigrants at the beginning of the twentieth century were still evident three-quarters of a century later, albeit in a muted form, among their third-generation descendants. By his estimate, it may take a century or more until ethnic differences among immigrants disappear from among their decedents.

For her part, Sassler (2006) has challenged both the time frame for the completion of assimilation, and the uniformity of straight-line assimilation, among European-origin groups in the United States. Examining ethnic and generational variation in school participation for youths in the 1920s, she finds evidence of stalled assimilation for several ethnic groups—namely, Italians, Poles and Jews—in that they failed to experience generational improvement in school participation. Other ethnic groups did experience generational improvement in this regard, but Sassler finds differences between them in the pace of straight-line assimilation. Ethnic groups from English-speaking countries were indistinguishable from the native-born stock by the third generation. In contrast, third-generation Germans continued to have lower rates of school participation than the native-born stock.

Boyd and Grieco (1998) have also challenged uniformity of straight-line assimilation with respect to ethnicity among European-origin groups in Canada. They document a general pattern of "triumphant transitions" for the second generation, meaning that it tends to outperform both the first and third-plus generations in educational attainment and occupational status. However, they find that European regions of origin are associated with the relative levels of upward mobility and with the second generation's educational attainment and occupational status.

Taken together, the findings reviewed in this section imply the fruitfulness of revisiting the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants. "Bumpy-line" imagery may provide a more accurate characterization of this process than the straight-line imagery that has become the norm. Or perhaps neither label applies to *all* European-origin groups. It is potentially problematic, then, to treat Europeans as an undifferentiated benchmark against which to evaluate the success of the new second generation in becoming economically incorporated into the receiving society.

METHODOLOGY

Model

In the literature on immigrant assimilation, generations are conceptualized as representing kinship descent (Kertzler, 1983). Accordingly, in order to study the intergenerational economic incorporation of immigrants, researchers need the type of data the genealogist wants: longitudinal data tracking successive generations of family members (Boyd, 2006; Niedert & Farley, 1985; Myers et al., 2006). In the absence of such data, they have had to make do with cross-sectional data.

The convention in current research on the economic incorporation of immigrants across generations, then, has been to infer it from cross-sectional analyses that compare different generations observed at a single time point (Boyd, 2006; Myers et al., 2006; e.g. Boyd, 2002; Carliner, 1980; Chiswick, 1977; Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004; Niedert & Farley, 1985). While this method may effectively measure *differences* between generations in a given outcome, it cannot capture intergenerational mobility (Myers et al., 2006). The problem with inferring intergenerational mobility from the conventional method is that individuals belonging to different generations vary widely in age. Since many economic statuses are related to age, it

becomes necessary to control for age in order to meaningfully compare the generations. Controlling for age means that all generations are the same age. This takes care of differences between generations in economic status owing to age, but it causes the measurement of generations to be at odds with their kinship-based conceptualization. As Myers and his colleagues (2006: 5) explain: "father, son, and grandfather, or persons representing those generations, cannot all be the same age in the same year. Immigrant first, second and third generations coexisting at the same age in the same year must not be related to one another."

To overcome the problems associated with inferring the intergenerational economic incorporation of immigrants from comparison of different generations observed at a single point in time, we employ an alternative technique that takes into account both the kinship-based conceptualization of generation and the age dependence of economic statuses. Myers and his colleagues (2006) have used a "lagged-generation model" to study the longitudinal process of immigrant incorporation from cross-sectional data (see also Myers and Lee, 1998; Park, 2008). This approach enables researchers to compare generations that *could be* related by kinship at the same age. It requires that the first generation be observed at a historical date that precedes the observation of the second generation by some 25 to 30 years, so as to simulate the spacing of kinship-based generations. These generations are to be observed at the same age or age range, thus limiting differences between them in the stage at which they are at in the career trajectory. In sum, by comparing first and second generations of the same age at two time points separated by 25 to 30 years, the possibility of differences between generations in economic status as a function of age is eliminated, while the possibility that these generations are related by kinship is enhanced.

If we stop here, this method avoids the problem associated with the conventional method of studying the economic incorporation of immigrants across generations; namely, that the measurement of generations is at odds with its kinship-based conceptualization. However, it encounters a different problem, in that generations are being compared from different historical periods, under different economic conditions. This means that both generations and periods are being compared. Myers and his colleagues note that, ignoring period effects, it may appear that the second generation has achieved a higher economic status than the first. Yet the upward mobility of the second generation may simply reflect progress in societal standards for the economic status that is the outcome.

To separate period effects from intergenerational mobility, economic progress between the first and second generations needs to be assessed in relation to an evolving standard. Since a third-plus generation exists in every era, Myers and colleagues advocate that it be used as a benchmark for gauging the economic conditions prevailing in each period. It also makes sense to use the third-plus generation as a benchmark because the economic incorporation of immigrants is understood as convergence toward the mainstream in labor-market participation and performance. Immigrants typically achieve assimilation by the third generation (Alba et al., 2002). For this reason, Alba and Nee (2003) suggest that the third-plus generation represents the mainstream toward which immigrants and their children are converging. In the lagged generation model, then, the economic status of the first generation in an earlier period is expressed relative to that of the third-plus generation in the same period. Similarly, the economic status of the second generation in a later period is expressed relative to that of the third-plus generation in the same period. This enables comparison of the first and second generations without the confounding effects of period.

Data

Our examination of the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants is based on data from the 1971 and 2001 census housed at Statistics Canada. The analysis focuses on European-origin men aged 30 to 54 years who worked at least one week during the census reference year (1970 or 2000) in an industry other than agriculture. In addition to having these characteristics, inclusion in the analysis required that respondents to the 1971 census be first or third-plus generation immigrants, and that respondents to the 2001 census be second or third-plus generation immigrants. The third-plus generation consists of native-born Canadians whose parents (and perhaps grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.) are also native-born. We define the first generation as the foreign-born who arrived in Canada as adults between 1946 and 1969. The second generation, as we have defined it, refers to the native-born children of two foreign-born parents.

Measures and Analytic Strategy

Our study of the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants in Canada considers the outcome of annual earnings. Other Canadian studies have used occupational status

and/or educational attainment as outcomes (e.g., Boyd & Grieco, 1998), but we find annual earnings preferable, as they are a more objective measure of immigrants' economic incorporation into the mainstream of the receiving society. After all, as Waldinger (2007: 32) points out, "prestige can't be eaten." Further, one of the advantages of looking at European-origin groups, as opposed to new-immigrant groups, is that the second generation is old enough to have established itself in the labor market, meaning that its economic incorporation can be measured directly. In contrast, scholars considering new-immigrant groups have had to contend with the youthfulness of the second generation, so they have had no choice but to infer its economic incorporation from measures of schooling (Alba & Nee, 1997). For these reasons, we use annual earnings as the outcome for our study of the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants in Canada.

Annual earnings are the sum of gross wages and salaries, and net self-employment income, in census reference year before paying individual income taxes. For consistency between the census reference years of 1970 and 2000, annual earnings in 1970 are expressed in constant 2000 dollars. Then, annual earnings are logged to minimize skewness. As (log) annual earnings is an interval variable, it is analyzed by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.

A series of models for annual earnings are constructed by successively incorporating sets of independent and control variables. Our baseline model extends the lagged generation model explicated by Myers and his colleagues, since we want to consider the possibility of ethnic differences in the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants. To avoid putting the cart before the horse, we begin by delineating the basic lagged generation model, applied to the outcome of annual earnings. The objective of this method is to contrast the annual earnings of the second generation in 2000 with those of the first generation in 1970, holding constant the annual earnings of the third-plus generation in each period. A control for age ensures that immigrant generations have a comparable age of maturity. The lagged generation model takes the form

$$Y' = a + b_1$$
 (Observation Year) + b_2 (Immigrant Generation) + b_3 (Observation Year * Immigrant Generation) + b_4 (Age) + b_i (X_i) + e_3

where:

- Observation Year is coded as one for the 2001 census, and as zero for the 1971 census;
- *Immigrant Generation* is coded as one for the first and second generations, and as zero for the third-plus generations;
- Age is center coded with 35 being equal to zero, meaning that the effect of age is expressed as deviations from that;
- and X_i are other determinants of the outcome.

In the above equation, the intercept (a) represents the annual earnings of the third-plus generation in 1970. The main effect for observation year (b_1) represents the change in the annual earnings of the third-plus generation between the census reference years of 1970 and 2000. It captures period effects on annual earnings; that is, societal progress in standards for annual earnings over time. The main effect for immigrant generation (b_2) represents the annual earnings of the first generation in 1970, relative to the annual earnings of the third-plus generation in the same year. The interaction effect for observation year and immigrant generation (b_3) is the factor of greatest interest in the above equation. It represents the degree of shift in annual earnings between the first and second generations, over and above temporal changes in the annual earnings of the third-plus generation. In other words, it stands for the difference in the relative annual earnings of the first and second generations.

To consider the possibility of ethnic differences in the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants, we extend the basic lagged generation model by including two-way interaction terms for immigrant generation and ethnicity as well as three-way interaction terms for observation year, immigrant generation, and ethnicity. (Of course, the lower-order terms they imply—ethnicity and observation year*ethnicity—are also included in our extension of the basic lagged generation model.) The coefficients for immigrant generation*ethnicity represent the annual earnings of the first generation in a given European-origin group, and the coefficients for observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity represent the shift in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations in a given European-origin group. These interaction terms are central to our analysis, as they provide baseline measures of the extent of economic incorporation characteristic of the first and second generations in each European-origin group: other Northern European (Scandinavian); French;

German; other Western European; Italian; other Southern European; Polish; Ukrainian; other Eastern European; and Jewish. For this analysis, the reference group is the third-plus generation of British origins. It constitutes the mainstream toward which the first and second generations in other European-origin groups are converging in terms of annual earnings.

Subsequent models control for various determinants of annual earnings. Here, we are interested in the extent to which the addition of these variables to the preceding model explains the relative annual earnings of the first generation and the shift in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations. Specifically, we are looking of a reduction between successive models in the value or significance of the coefficients for *immigrant generation*ethnicity* and those for *observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity*. This indicates the contribution of the added variables to explanation of the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants that is observed in the preceding model.

Control Variables

We consider two sets of determinants of annual earnings: employment characteristics and human-capital characteristics. Employment characteristics include marital status, class of worker in the census reference year, hours worked in the census reference year, weeks worked in the census reference year, and Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of work. It may seem odd to consider marital status as an employment characteristic. However, marital status is associated with earnings due, in part, to its effect on labor supply (Vargas, 2005). Married men work more than do single men, as they have dependents or other expenditures beyond their own. Marriage also enhances men's performance at work. As Waite (1995: 496) explains:

Wives may assist husbands directly with their work, offer advice or support, or take over household tasks, freeing husband's time and energy for work. Also...being married reduces negative health behaviors such as drinking and substance abuse, which may affect productivity. Finally, marriage increases men's incentives to perform well at work, so as to meet obligations to family members.

Marital status is included in the analysis as a dichotomous variable: married and unmarried. In 1971, respondents to the census were instructed to identify themselves as married if they were living in a common-law union. For this reason, the married category of marital status includes cohabiters. The residual category includes the single (never married), separated, divorced, and

widowed. In the multivariate analysis, "married" serves as the reference category on marital status.

Self-employment affects labor market performance, but the direction of its effect is uncertain (Frenette, 2004). The "push" hypothesis suggests that individuals resort to self-employment due to a lack of opportunities in the paid labor market (Frenette, 2004; Finnie, 2003). The "pull" hypothesis suggests that individuals are enticed out of the paid labor market by lucrative opportunities in self-employment. These hypotheses imply divergent outcomes with respect to labor market performance: the former implies that the self-employed are disadvantaged compared to those in the paid labor force, while the latter implies that the self-employed do better than those in the paid labor force. Since class of worker affects earnings one way or another, we distinguish between the self-employed and those in the paid labor force, with the latter serving as the reference group in the multivariate analysis.

Obviously, weeks and hours worked positively affect annual earnings. Weeks worked refers to the number of weeks worked in the census reference year. For the 1971 census, weeks worked were reported in five categories: 1-13 weeks; 14-26 weeks; 27-39 weeks; 40-48 weeks; and 49-52 weeks. For the 2001 census, on the other hand, weeks worked were reported in disaggregated form. The coding of weeks worked in the 2001 census had to be brought in line with that in the 1971 census. Weeks worked appears in the multivariate analysis as a set of four independent variables for which "49-52 weeks" is the reference category. Hours worked refers to whether the weeks worked in the census reference year were mainly full-time or part-time weeks. In the multivariate analysis, "full-time" serves as the reference category on hours worked.

Earnings are paid in the context of the local labor market, so the ability of immigrants and their children to become economically incorporated depends, in part, on their place of work. A number of local labor market conditions contribute to variability in earnings, including: the degree of segmentation; enclave economies; the earnings distribution; the extent of competition between immigrants and the native-born; unionization; and rates of employment and underemployment (Reitz, 1998). For immigrants, another local labor market condition that affects their economic incorporation is receptivity attitudes toward immigrants among members of the mainstream. De Jong and Steinmetz (2004) demonstrate that immigrants' occupational attainment in the United States is enhanced in regional labor markets where citizens hold more positive attitudes toward immigrant workers. Here, place of work is measured by CMA of work:

Calgary; Edmonton; Halifax; Hamilton; Kitchener; London; Montreal; Ottawa-Hull; St.Catherines-Niagara; Toronto; Vancouver; Windsor; Winnipeg; and other CMAs and non-CMAs. Toronto serves as the reference category on CMA of work in the multivariate analysis.

The human-capital characteristics included in our analysis are educational attainment and proficiency in at least one of Canada's official languages (English and French). Both of these human-capital characteristics have been emphasized in the literature as determinants of the intergenerational economic incorporation of immigrants. It is well-established that immigrants earn less than the native-born who are their counterparts in human capital—at least initially (see Alboim et al., 2005; Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005; Baker & Benjamin, 1994; Bloom et al., 1995; Bloom & Gunderson, 1991; Carliner, 1981; Frenette & Morisette, 2005; Grant, 1999; Hum & Simpson, 2004; Meng, 1987; Picot & Sweetman, 2005). This earnings gap has been understood in terms of differences between immigrants and the native-born in the value of their human capital (Hiebert, 1999).

Differences between immigrants and the native-born in the value of their human capital stem from where it was acquired—abroad or domestically. Some human capital is country-specific, meaning that it is not transferable cross-nationally without loss of value. It is either of poorer quality or lower relevance in labor markets outside of the country in which it was acquired. Immigrants are disadvantaged in the labor market, relative to the native-born, then, because some of their knowledge and skills are specific to the labor market of their origin country. In the case of education and work experience, it is devalued or discounted in the labor market of the host country, meaning that immigrants receive lower economic returns to their human capital than do the native-born (see Alboim et al., 2005; Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005; Baker & Benjamin, 1994; Frenette & Morisette, 2005; Friedberg, 2000; Green & Worswick, 2004). In the case of language proficiency, immigrants may lack this human capital in relation to the labor market of the host country, which is reward for reasons discussed below.

Proficiency in the language of the receiving society affects labor-market performance through both job search and on-the-job productivity. Low levels of proficiency in the language of the receiving society inhibit job search such that the range and quality of jobs available to workers are restricted (Berman et al., 2003; Bleakley & Chin, 2004; Chiswick & Miller, 2003; Djajić, 2003; Kossoudji, 1988). On the job, proficiency in the language of the receiving society increases the productivity of labor by facilitating efficient oral and written communication with

supervisors, subordinates, peer, suppliers, and customers (Chiswick & Miller, 2002). Language proficiency is also complementary with other forms of human capital (Bleakley & Chin, 2004; Chiswick & Miller, 2003; Park, 1999). By facilitating the utilization of other forms of human capital in the workplace, destination-language proficiency increases their productivity.

It is generally expected that the labor market performance of immigrants will steadily improve, relative to that of the native-born, with increasing time spent in the host country. Immigrants will make investments in their human capital to acquire knowledge and skills that are specific to the host country, enabling them to eventually overcome the initial immigrant/native-born earnings gap. Although immigrants can make human capital investments in the host country in order to improve their labor market performance vis-à-vis the native-born, the costs of so doing are initially borne as lost wages, compounding their initial economic disadvantage (Borjas, 2000). These costs may be so prohibitive for some immigrants that acquisition of human capital that is specific to the host country and, by implication, economic incorporation is not a matter of increasing durations spent in the host country, but, rather, of the passage of generations.

Since the second generation of immigrants is born in the host country, they do not face the same challenges as their parents with respect destination-language proficiency and the valuation of their educational attainment. In this regard, the advantage of the second generation over the first generation in the labor market of the host country is not just that their human capital is acquired domestically; it is also that there may be a generational upgrading of human capital.

Education is empowered by immigrants. Studies of the aspirations of immigrants show that many come to Canada hoping for economic success for themselves and their children (James & Burnaby, 2003). They tend to place confidence in education as a means of gaining access to opportunities and extending possibilities in the labor market, thus enabling upward mobility. Hence, many immigrants instill their children with high educational aspirations, and make immense sacrifices so that their children can achieve them. The implications of the second generation's high educational aspirations, and the sacrifices made by immigrants to enable their achievement, are borne out in research on generational differences in educational attainment. It documents advances in schooling made by the second generation over the first generation (Alba

& Nee, 2003; Borjas, 1994 & 1999; Boyd & Grieco, 1998; Boyd, 2002; Farley & Alba, 2002; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Smith, 2006).

In the realm of language, a three-generation process of assimilation has prevailed (Alba et al., 2002: 267). For the United States, Portes and Schauffler (1994), Portes and Rumbaut (2001), and Alba and his colleagues (2002) demonstrate that knowledge of English is near universal among second generation immigrants. By the third generation, Alba and colleagues (2002) show that the majority speaks *only* English.

Clearly, educational attainment and destination-language proficiency are considered to be key mechanisms of economic mobility across immigrant generations. For this reason, we include them in our analysis. Combining information in the 1971 census on highest level of schooling attended or completed and completion of a (full-time) vocational course, and using information in the 2001 census on highest level of schooling attended or completed, we distinguish between six levels of educational attainment: less than a high school diploma; high school diploma; trades/college certificate or diploma; some post-secondary; Bachelor's degree; and certificate or degree above Bachelor's degree. In the multivariate analysis, educational attainment is represented by a set of five dummy variables, with "high school diploma" serving as the reference category.

Language proficiency is measured on a sliding scale of skills in English and/or French that was developed by Boyd and her colleagues (1994). Using information on mother tongue, official language spoken, and language spoken most often at home, a typology is created. Weak language proficiency corresponds to knowledge of neither English nor French; somewhat weak language proficiency corresponds to a mother tongue and home language other than English and/or French, but with knowledge of English and/or French; somewhat strong language proficiency corresponds to a mother tongue other than English and/or French, but a home language of English and/or French; and strong language proficiency corresponds to a mother tongue of English and/or French. Language proficiency appears in the multivariate analysis as a set of two dummy variables for which "strong" is the reference category.

Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample, stratified by observation year and immigrant generation, for all of the employment and human-capital characteristics discussed above.

MULTIVARIATE RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results of our multivariate analysis of (log) annual earnings among European-origin groups in Canada. Here, we find evidence that the process of intergenerational economic incorporation for European immigrants is characterized by ethnic diversity. The relative earnings of the first generation, the extent of upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations, and the mechanisms of intergenerational economic incorporation all vary with ethnicity.

In the baseline model, the coefficients for *immigrant generation*ethnicity* indicate that all first-generation Europeans have lower annual earnings than the reference group, which is the third-plus generation of British origins. Yet, the extent to which this is true depends on ethnicity. Southern- and Eastern-European origins, as well as Jewish origins, generally imply an "entrance status" that is more disadvantaged than Northern- and Western-European origins. Often, however, the second generation not only makes up for the fact that the first generation has lower annual earnings than the third-plus generation of British origins, but even surpasses the reference group in annual earnings. This is indicated by comparison of the coefficients for *immigrant generation*ethnicity* with the corresponding coefficients for *observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity*. For Western Europeans excluding the French, Eastern Europeans excluding Ukrainians, and the Jewish, the improvement in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations more than compensates for the first generation's relative disadvantage in annual earnings. Thus, straight-line assimilation not only characterizes the intergenerational economic incorporation of these European-origin groups, but it is achieved swiftly—that is, by the second generation.

Italians and Ukrainians also experience upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations, consistent with straight-line assimilation. However, the second generation's advantage over the first generation in relative annual earnings is not sufficient to overcome the lower annual earnings of the first generation relative to the third-plus generation of British origins. For Italians and Ukrainians, then, the time frame for completion of intergenerational economic incorporation extends beyond the second generation. Scandinavians, the French, and non-Italian Southern Europeans are even worse off, in that they do not experience significant upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations. This means that, for these European-origin groups, the relative disadvantage of the

first generation in annual earnings persists into the second generation. The process of intergenerational economic incorporation seems have stalled for Scandinavians, the French, and non-Italian Southern Europeans. We can interpret the second generation's failure to achieve upward mobility in relative annual earnings over the first generation as evidence of bumpy-line assimilation among these European-origin groups, as long as subsequent generations tend to improve their relative annual earnings vis-à-vis predecessors. Otherwise, economic incorporation may continue elude Scandinavians, the French, and non-Italian Southern Europeans, even with the passage of generations.

As additional determinants of annual earnings are successively incorporated into the analysis as control variables (see Models 2 through 4), it can be observed that the coefficients for immigrant generation*ethnicity, and those for observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity, tend to be progressively reduced in value or significance in comparison to the preceding models. This indicates the contribution of the new variables to explanation of the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants. Statistical adjustments for employment characteristics do not really change the overall picture that emerges from the baseline model (see Model 2), but statistical adjustments for human-capital characteristics do. When educational attainment is controlled in the third model, the first generation of Scandinavians is no longer significantly different from the third-plus generation of British origins in annual earnings. For the remaining European-origin groups, the first generation continues to have lower annual earnings than the reference group, but, for the most part, the relative disadvantage of the first generation is reduced in comparison to preceding models. Controlling for educational attainment also reduces the extent of improvement in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations. In fact, for other Western Europeans, Italians, and Ukrainians, the upward mobility of the second generation over the first generation in relative annual earnings that remains after employment characteristics have been taken into account is completely explained by its higher levels of educational attainment. This is indicated by the now non-significant coefficients for observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity. For the Dutch, Germans, the Polish, other Eastern Europeans, and the Jewish, comparisons of the coefficients for immigrant generation*ethnicity with those for observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity reveal that they would indeed experience intergenerational mobility in relative annual earnings, even if the second generation did not have higher levels of educational attainment than the first generation. In this case,

however, only the Dutch and the Jewish would experience sufficient improvement in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations to overcome the relative disadvantage of the first generation.

Controlling for proficiency in at least one of Canada's official languages in the fourth model further reduces the relative disadvantage of the first generation in annual earnings, as indicated by the coefficients for *immigrant generation*ethnicity*. Indeed, for Germans and other Western Europeans excluding the Dutch and the French, the annual earnings of the first generation are no longer significantly different from those of the third-plus generation of British origins. The coefficients for *observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity* are also further reduced when statistical adjustments are made for destination-language proficiency. Now, only the Dutch, other Eastern Europeans, and the Jewish experience a significant improvement in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations. And only in the case of the Dutch and the Jewish is it enough to compensate for the relative disadvantage of the first generation in annual earnings.

An interesting anomaly emerges in the third and fourth models. When human-capital characteristics are taken into account, other Northern Europeans in the first generation are no longer significantly different from the third-plus generation of British origins in annual earnings. Further, other Northern Europeans now experience significant mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations, but it is downward (see the coefficient for observation year*immigrant generation*other Northern European, which is negative). This means that the second generation of other Northern Europeans is actually at a greater relative disadvantage than the first generation, controlling for human-capital characteristics.

Comparing the decrement between models in the coefficients for *immigrant generation*ethnicity* give us a sense of the relative importance of employment characteristics and human-capital characteristics in explaining the relative disadvantage of the first generation in annual earnings. The same logic applies to the coefficients for *observation year*immigrant generation*ethnicity*, but, here, we are interested in the relative importance of these characteristics in explaining the upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations. (These results are not shown, but they can be easily calculated from Table 2.) We find that the relative importance of employment characteristics and human-capital characteristics in explaining the intergenerational economic incorporation of European

immigrants varies with ethnicity. Employment characteristics explain a greater portion of both the relative disadvantage of the first generation, and the improvement in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations, among Northern and Western Europeans than they do among Southern and Eastern Europeans and the Jewish. Conversely, educational attainment and, to a lesser extent, destination-language proficiency explain a greater portion of both the relative disadvantage of the first generation, and the improvement in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations, among Southern and Eastern Europeans and the Jewish than they do among Northern and Western Europeans. Among Northern and Western Europeans, then, an upgrading of employment characteristics between the first and second generations is relatively more important to their intergenerational economic incorporation. Among Southern and Eastern Europeans and the Jewish, the reverse is true: improvement in human-capital characteristics between the first and second generations is relatively more important to their intergenerational economic incorporation.

DISCUSSION

Contemporary research on the intergenerational economic incorporation of immigrants focuses on "new" immigrants and their children. Paradoxically, it has become increasingly important to understand the experiences of their European predecessors. This is because the success of newimmigrant groups in becoming economically incorporated into the mainstream is evaluated against the experiences of European-immigrant groups. Straight-line assimilation portrays their incorporation into the mainstream of the receiving society as a process in which the degree of cultural assimilation increases with each generation of immigrants, facilitating social and economic mobility vis-à-vis predecessors. Some scholars have questioned the uniformity of straight-line assimilation among European-origin groups, based on evidence of "bumps" in otherwise sequential process of generational progress leading toward convergence with the mainstream, and on evidence of ethnic variability in the extent of upward mobility between generations. In Canada, researchers interested in the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants have not been able to examine it directly, owing to limitations in data and methods. Analyzing data from the 1971 and 2001 census housed at Statistics Canada by means of a lagged generation that enables us to study this longitudinal process from cross-sectional data, we have surmounted these limitations to study the extent and mechanisms of upward

mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations of European immigrants in Canada. In so doing, we have established a benchmark against which to evaluate the progress of new immigrants in becoming economically incorporated into the mainstream with the passage of generations.

We find that, in fact, no one benchmark will suffice to characterize the experiences of *all* European-origin groups. Both the magnitude and mechanisms of European immigrants' intergenerational economic incorporation into the mainstream vary by ethnicity.

The first generation in all European-origin groups has lower annual earnings than the third-plus generation of British origins. However, we find evidence that European-origin groups once considered to be less desirable are subject to a more disadvantaged "entrance status" than their more desirable counterparts. Specifically, in the first generation, the relative annual earnings of Southern and Eastern Europeans and the Jewish are lower than those of Northern and Western Europeans.

Our study demonstrates that, in addition to ethnic differences in the entrance status of first-generation Europeans, there is substantial variability by ethnicity in the magnitude of upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations. Typically, the second generation not only makes up for the fact that the first generation has lower annual earnings than the third-plus generation of British origins, but even surpasses the reference group in annual earnings. This is the case for Western Europeans excluding the French, Eastern Europeans excluding Ukrainians, and the Jewish. For these European-origin groups, then, straight-line assimilation characterizes their intergenerational economic incorporation, which is achieved by the second generation. Second-generation Italians and Ukrainians also experience upward mobility in relative annual earnings over the first generation, but it is not sufficient to overcome the disadvantaged entrance status of the first generation. While straight-line assimilation characterizes the intergenerational economic incorporation of these European-origin groups, the time frame for completion extends beyond the second generation. Scandinavians, the French, and non-Italian Southern Europeans are even worse off, in that they do not experience significant upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations. That the process of intergenerational economic incorporation seems to have stalled for these European-origin groups may be taken as evidence of bumpy-line assimilation, if subsequent generations tend to improve their relative annual earnings vis-à-vis predecessors. If not,

economic incorporation will continue to elude Scandinavians, the French, and non-Italian Southern Europeans, even with the passage of generations.

The mechanisms of European immigrants' intergenerational economic incorporation also depend on ethnicity. Among Northern and Western Europeans, employment characteristics play a greater role in explaining the disadvantaged entrance status of the first generation, and the upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations, than either educational attainment or destination-language proficiency. In contrast, among Southern and Eastern Europeans and the Jewish, educational attainment and, to a lesser extent, destination-language proficiency play a relatively greater role in this regard.

In sum, our findings contribute to the literature on the intergenerational economic incorporation of immigrants by empirically evaluating, and subsequently challenging, the uniformity of straight-line assimilation among European-origin groups. We have provided evidence that ethnic diversity characterizes the magnitude and the mechanisms of upward mobility in relative annual earnings between the first and second generations of European immigrants in Canada. For this reason, immigration scholars should reconsider their treatment of European-origin groups as undifferentiated by ethnicity in terms of their experiences of assimilation across generations of immigrants. This is especially true for those interested in the economic incorporation of new immigrants and their children. They tend to recognize ethnic diversity among their subjects at the same time as downplaying it among European-origin groups—the benchmark against which the success of the former is evaluated.

Future research on the intergenerational economic incorporation of European immigrants in the United States and Canada might make use of a more finely-graded variable for immigrant generation, which would include the 1.5 and 2.5 generations, in order to more accurately represent the dynamic nature of the process (e.g., Park, 2008). It might also consider additional mechanisms of immigrants' economic incorporation with the passage of generations, such as residence and/or employment in ethnic enclaves (e.g., Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997).

Table 1. Relative Distribution (%) of Selected Variables by Observation Year and Immigrant Generation

	,	1971	2	001	
	1st	3rd-Plus	2nd	3rd-Plus	
	Generation	Generation	Generation	Generation	
N	141,980	44,054	489,162	163,825	
Duration or Years Since Arrival in					
Canada	100.0	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Less than 5 years	12.4	n/a	n/a	n/a	
5-9 years	12.2	n/a	n/a	n/a	
10-14 years	31.0	n/a	n/a	n/a	
At Least 15 years	44.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Age	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
30-34	17.7	23.5	26.4	15.4	
35-39	23.7	21.3	29.2	20.9	
40-44	24.8	20.2	25.1	22.7	
45-49	21.5	18.7	19.9	22.0	
50-54	12.3	16.3	6.4	19.0	
Ethnicity	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
British	24.2	44.4	20.9	60.2	
Other Northern European Origins	2.6	0.6	1.8	1.6	
Dutch	6.1	0.9	12.9	1.0	
French	2.4	47.8	0.7	20.8	
German	13.0	3.9	12.0	6.7	
Other Western European Origins	1.3	0.1	1.2	0.5	
Italian	22.5	0.4	27.9	1.3	
Other Southern European Origins	11.7	0.1	9.9	0.4	
Polish	4.4	0.4	3.4	0.9	
Ukrainian	2.8	0.8	3.1	4.5	
Other Eastern European Origins	7.0	0.3	4.4	1.1	
Jewish	2.1	0.2	1.6	1.2	
Marital Status	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Married	89.7	85.4	74.2	75.5	
Single, Widowed, Separated, or	;		1		
Divorced	10.3	14.6	25.8	24.5	
Class of Worker	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Employed by Others	88.2	88.4	82.4	85.0	
Self-Employed	11.8	11.6	17.6	15.0	
Weeks Worked	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
1-13 weeks	1.6	2.5	1.6	2.6	
14-26 weeks	3.8	5.2	3.4	5.3	
27-39 weeks	8.5	8.1	5.7	7.4	
40-48 weeks	17.3	13.8	20.8	19.5	
49-52 weeks	68.8	70.4	68.5	65.2	
Hours Worked	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Mostly Full-Time	97.5	94.5	96.2	95.2	
Mostly Part-Time	2.5	5.5	3.8	4.8	

Table 1 (Continued). Relative Distribution (%) of Selected Variables by Observation Year and Immigrant Generation

		1971	2001			
	1st	3rd-Plus	2nd	3rd-Plus		
	Generation	Generation	Generation	Generation		
N	141,980	44,054	489,162	163,825		
CMA of Work	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Calgary	2.4	0.9	3.3	3.5		
Edmonton	2.5	1.1	3.1	3.1		
Halifax	0.4	1.6	0.4	1.9		
Hamilton	4.6	1.4	3.6	1.7		
Kitchener	1.8	1.0	1.8	1.5		
London	1.8	1.1	1.9	1.6		
Montreal	12.6	14.8	8.9	7.2		
Ottawa-Hull	2.2	3.2	2.6	3.7		
St. Catherines-Niagara	2.1	1.0	2.0	1.1		
Toronto	30.9	7.2	27.7	10.4		
Vancouver	7.1	2.0	6.6	4.4		
Windsor	1.5	0.9	1.4	1.1		
Winnipeg	2.6	1.4	2.2	2.7		
Other CMAs and Non-CMAs	27.5	62.4	34.6	56.3		
Educational Attainment	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Less than a High School Diploma	51.8	70.7	12.8	20.4		
High School Diploma Trades/College Certificate or	4.1	1.5	12.4	14.0		
Diploma	6.8	5.0	10.8	9.4		
Some Post-Secondary	30.9	16.2	39.6	36.8		
Bachelor's Degree	1.9	2.6	16.3	12.4		
University Certificate or Degree	į					
above Bachelor's Level	4.4	4.0	8.1	7.0		
Proficiency in English and/or						
French	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Weak	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Somewhat Weak	37.6	0.3	2.9	0.1		
Somewhat Strong	26.8	1.8	32.4	1.1		
Strong	29.6	97.9	64.7	98.8		
Earnings from Wages/Salary and Self-Employment in Constant (2000)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Dollars	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Negative or Zero Earnings	0.4	0.4	1.5	1.9		
Positive Earnings, Less than \$5,000	1.4	2.7	2.9	3.4		
\$5,000-\$9,999	2.2	3.9	2.4	3.2		
\$10,000-\$14,999	3.4	5.1	3.1	3.9		
\$15,000-\$1 9 ,999	5.6	7.4	3.4	4.3		
\$20,000-\$19,999	21.3	21.3	10.2	11.9		
\$30,000-\$39,999	28.5	25.7	15.1	15.7		
\$40,000-\$39,999 \$40,000-\$49,999	17.4	15.6	15.6	15.7		
\$50,000-\$59,999	8.5	7.2	13.5	12.6		
\$60,000-\$59,999	6.8	6.0	17.2	15.5		
At Least \$80,000	4.4	4.6	15.1	12.3		

Table 2. Multivariate Results for (Log) Annual Earnings from Wages/Salary and Self-Employment

Observation Year 1971 (rg) 2001 0.038 ** Immigrant Generation 1st & 2nd Generations 0.303 * 3rd+ Generation -0.160 * Centered Age (0 = 35 Years) -0.002 * Ethnicity British (rg) Other Northern European Origins -0.016 (rg) Other Northern European Origins -0.014 (rg) Dutch -0.014 (rg) French -0.100 * German -0.016 (rg) Other Western European Origins 0.043 (rg) Italian -0.005 (rg) Other Southern European -0.148 * Polish -0.083 * Ukrainian -0.053 * Observation Year * Ethnicity * * 1971*British (rg) * 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*German -0.016<	Model 1			Model 3		Model 4	
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Immigrant Generation							
Immigrant Generation		(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	
1st & 2nd Generation 0.303 ** 3rd+ Generation (rg) Observation Year * Immigrant Generation -0.160 * Centered Age (0 = 35 Years) -0.002 * Ethnicity British (rg) Outle -0.016 (rg) Other Northern European Origins -0.014 (rg) (rg) Dutch -0.010 * French -0.010 * German -0.016 (rg) Other Western European Origins 0.043 (rg) Italian -0.05 (rg) Other Southern European -0.048 * Ukrainian -0.053 * Other Eastern European -0.073 * Jewish 0.264 * Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (r 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (r 2001*German -0.019 (r 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177	***	0.080	***	-0.047	***	-0.046	***
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Italian -0.005 (n Other Southern European -0.148 * Polish -0.083 * Ukrainian -0.053 * Other Eastern European -0.073 * Jewish 0.264 * Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (n 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.016 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (n 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (n 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (n	(ns)	-0.031	***	-0.015	(ns)	-0.009	(ns)
Other Southern European -0.148 * Polish -0.083 * Ukrainian -0.053 * Other Eastern European -0.073 * Jewish 0.264 * Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (rg) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (rg) 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (rg)	(ns)	0.047	(ns)	0.057	(ns)	0.061	(ns)
Polish -0.083 * Ukrainian -0.053 * Other Eastern European -0.073 * Jewish 0.264 * **Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (rg) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (rg) 2001*Other Southern European Origins -0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (rg)	(ns)	0.012	(ns)	0.049	*	0.061	*
Ukrainian -0.053 * Other Eastern European -0.073 * Jewish 0.264 * Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (rg) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (rg) 2001*Other Southern European Origins -0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (rg)	***	-0.006	(ns)	0.038	(ns)	0.060	(ns)
Other Eastern European -0.073 * Jewish 0.264 * Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (rg) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Other Southern European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Other Southern European Origins -0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (rg)	***	-0.032	(ns)	0.007	(ns)	0.018	(ns)
Jewish 0.264 * Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (r 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (r 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (r	**	-0.016	(ns)	0.004	(ns)	0.020	(ns)
Observation Year * Ethnicity 1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (rg) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (rg) 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (rg)	*	0.022	(ns)	0.047	(ns)	0.070	**
1971*British (rg) 2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (rg) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (rg) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (rg) 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (rg)	***	0.276	***	0.213	***	0.218	***
2001*Other Northern European Origins -0.012 (i) 2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (i) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (i) 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (i)							
2001*Dutch -0.114 * 2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (i) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (i) 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (i)		(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	
2001*French -0.016 * 2001*German -0.019 (i) 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (i) 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (i)	(ns)	-0.018	(ns)	0.010	(ns)	0.007	(ns)
2001*German -0.019 (r 2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (r 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (r	***	-0.118	***	-0.067	*	-0.072	*
2001*Other Western European Origins -0.177 * 2001*Italian 0.050 (i) 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (i)	*	-0.032	***	-0.058	***	-0.058	***
2001*Italian 0.050 0.050 2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 0.032	(ns)	-0.001	(ns)	0.027	*	0.024	(ns)
2001*Other Southern European 0.179 * 2001*Polish 0.032 (i)	**	-0.168	**	-0.147	*	-0.149	*
2001*Polish 0.032 (i	(ns)	-0.032	(ns)	-0.060	(ns)	-0.072	*
`	**	0.017	(ns)	-0.033	(ns)	-0.054	(ns)
2001*Ukrainian 0.030 (i	(ns)	-0.033	(ns)	-0.059	(ns)	-0.069	(ns)
	(ns)	-0.008	(ns)	-0.007	(ns)	-0.021	(ns)
2001*Other Eastern European 0.037 (i	(ns)	-0.034	(ns)	-0.038	(ns)	-0.058	(ns)
2001*Jewish 0.154 *	***	0.055	(ns)	-0.105	**	-0.110	**

Table 2 (Continued). Multivariate Results for (Log) Annual Earnings from Wages/Salary and Self-Employment

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	ß		ß		ß		ß	
Immigrant Generation*Ethnicity								
3rd+ Generation*British	(rg)		(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	
1st & 2nd Generations*Other Northern European Origins	-0.214	***	-0.071	**	-0.032	(ns)	0.015	(ns)
1st & 2nd Generations*Dutch	-0.172	***	-0.093	***	-0.066	***	-0.041	*
1st & 2nd Generations*French	-0.171	***	-0.064	***	-0.105	***	-0.102	***
1st & 2nd Generations*German	-0.173	***	-0.073	***	-0.052	***	0.001	(ns)
1st & 2nd Generations*Other Western European Origins	-0.219	***	-0.135	**	-0.123	*	-0.083	(ns)
1st & 2nd Generations*Italian	-0.386	***	-0.306	***	-0.190	***	-0.092	***
1st & 2nd Generations*Other Southern European	-0.332	***	-0.358	***	-0.279	***	-0.206	***
1st & 2nd Generations*Polish	-0.219	***	-0.174	***	-0.136	***	-0.078	**
1st & 2nd Generations*Ukrainian	-0.292	***	-0.250	***	-0.166	***	-0.096	***
1st & 2nd Generations*Other Eastern European	-0.215	***	-0.186	***	-0.205	***	-0.159	***
1st & 2nd Generations*Jewish	-0.386	***	-0.320	***	-0.213	***	-0.169	***
Observation Year*Immigrant Generation*Ethnicity								
1971*3rd+ Generation*British	(rg)		(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Other Northern European Origins	-0.024	(ns)	-0.090	(ns)	-0.137	**	-0.176	***
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Dutch	0.361	***	0.267	***	0.198	***	0.174	***
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*French	-0.085	(ns)	-0.099	(ns)	-0.093	(ns)	-0.096	(ns)
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*German	0.216	***	0.118	***	0.051	*	0.005	(ns)
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Other Western European Origins	0.262	**	0.169	*	0.117	(ns)	0.080	(ns)
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Italian	0.241	***	0.175	***	0.060	(ns)	-0.023	(ns)
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Other Southern European	0.070	(ns)	0.121	(ns)	0.054	(ns)	0.001	(ns)
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Polish	0.269	***	0.224	***	0.123	*	0.077	(ns)
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Ukrainian	0.229	***	0.217	***	0.063	(ns)	0.010	(ns)
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Other Eastern European	0.255	***	0.196	***	0.145	**	0.109	*
2001*1st & 2nd Generations*Jewish	0.410	***	0.398	***	0.310	***	0.271	***
Marital Status								
Married Unattached: Single, Widowed, Separated, or Divorced			(rg) -0.326	***	(rg) -0.317	***	(rg) -0.318	***
Class of Worker								
Employed by Others			(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	
Self-Employed			-0.249	***	-0.284	***	-0.285	***
Number of Weeks Worked								
1-13 weeks			-1.622	***	-1.573	***	-1.572	***
14-26 weeks			-0.889	***	-0.841	***	-0.840	***
27-39 weeks			-0.447	***	-0.403	***	-0.402	***
40-48 weeks			-0.112	***	-0.096	***	-0.095	***
49-52 weeks			(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	

Table 2 (Continued). Multivariate Results for (Log) Annual Earnings from Wages/Salary and Self-Employment

	Model	1	Model 2		Model 3 ß		Model 4	
	ß						ß	
Hours Worked								
Mostly Full-Time			(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	
Mostly Part-Time			-0.603	***	-0.590	***	-0.590	***
CMA of Work								
Calgary			0.000	(ns)	-0.021	*	-0.025	***
Edmonton			-0.049	***	-0.042	***	-0.045	***
Halifax			-0.183	***	-0.181	***	-0.184	***
Hamilton			-0.067	***	-0.039	***	-0.042	***
Kitchener			-0.113	***	-0.084	***	-0.085	***
London			-0.122	***	-0.102	***	-0.105	***
Montreal			-0.124	***	-0.128	***	-0.130	***
Ottawa-Hull			-0.001	(ns)	-0.043	***	-0.046	***
St. Catherines-Niagara			-0.109	***	-0.073	***	-0.078	***
Toronto			(rg)		(rg)		(rg)	
Vancouver			-0.018	*	-0.028	***	-0.033	***
Windsor			0.060	***	0.087	***	0.084	***
Winnipeg			-0.196	***	-0.186	***	-0.186	***
Other CMAs & Non-CMAs			-0.259	***	-0.217	***	-0.220	***
Educational Attainment								
Less than a High School Diploma					-0.130	***	-0.128	***
High School Diploma					(rg)		(rg)	
Some Post Secondary					0.048	***	0.048	***
Trades/College Certificate or Diploma					0.054	***	0.053	***
Bachelor's Degree					0.414	***	0.415	***
University Certificate or Degree above Bachelor's Level					0.646	***	0.647	***
Proficiency in English and/or French								
Weak							-0.217	***
Somewhat Weak							-0.111	***
Somewhat Strong							-0.022	**
Strong							(rg)	
R Square	0.008		0.156		0.181		0.183	
R Square Change	0.001	***	0.148	***	0.025	***	0.001	***

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