

U.S. POLICY OF MASSIVE MIGRANT REMOVAL: IMPACTS ON SALVADORAN MIGRANTS

Nestor Rodriguez
University of Texas at Austin

Jacqueline Maria Hagan
University of North Carolina

In the 1990s, the U.S. government intensified immigration enforcement through a series of new laws. One law in particular, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, dramatically increased the detention and formal removal of international migrants by expanding the list of criteria for detaining and deporting migrants, by limiting the ability of migrants to appeal deportation orders, and by limiting the power of immigration judges to grant relief to migrants convicted of relatively minor crimes. Detention and deportation of international migrants rose dramatically after 1996. Prior to 1996, the number of international migrants detained remained below 7,500 per day and the number formally removed from the country was fewer than 50,000 annually. But after 1996, these numbers rose sharply and by FY2005 reached 19,718 migrants detained per day and 208,521 formally removed (Congressional Research Service 2004, figure 1, 2006, figure 7; U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, table 40). Latin American migrants account for a large majority of the deported migrants. Mexicans alone accounted for 69 percent of the migrants formally removed in 2005 (Office of Immigration Statistics 2006).

The Office of Detention and Removal (DRO), within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), released a strategic plan in March 2003 to accelerate the already massive deportation of “removable aliens” with the goal of removing all

deportable migrants by 2012. DRO called its strategic plan the “Endgame” (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003).

In spite of the great number of international migrants that are annually detained and formally removed from the country, sociologists have been slow to focus on how this massive deportation affects migrant populations and communities. Only a few sociological articles have been published on the impacts of the massive annual removal of migrants (e.g., Hagan and Rodriguez 2002; Rodriguez and Hagan 2004). This paper attempts to emphasize the significance of the dramatic rise of deportations for Latin American origin communities in the United States by summarizing the findings of two studies conducted by University of Houston researchers (Nestor Rodriguez and Jacqueline Hagan) to investigate impacts of U.S. immigration policy enacted in the mid-1990s. One study focused on how restrictive measures enacted in the mid-1990s affected migrants in five Texas communities (Hagan and Rodriguez 2002). The second study investigated conditions and characteristics of migrants detained and deported to El Salvador (Hagan, Eschbach and Rodriguez forthcoming). The findings of the two studies support the view that the intensification of immigration enforcement starting in the mid-1990s created a new dimension that would profoundly affect the quality of social life in immigrant populations in the United States.

INTENSIFICATION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Since the late 1980s, federal laws have increased the list of criminal offenses for which migrants can be deported. The enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1988 created the deportable category of “aggravated felonies,” which included murder and crimes of moral turpitude, and reduced the opportunities for migrants to challenge orders of

deportation (Human Rights Watch 2007). Passage of the Immigration Act of 1990 added to the list of deportable offenses by including “crimes of violence” for which migrants could be imprisoned for at least five years. The Immigration and Technical Corrections Act of 1994 added crimes such as money laundering, drug trafficking, prostitution, tax evasion, and certain kinds of theft and fraud to the list of “aggravated felonies” (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Passage of IIRIRA in 1996, however, significantly altered patterns of detention and deportation. Enacted five months after the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which expanded deportable offenses with 17 additional crimes, IIRIRA added to the list of aggravated felonies and reduced the imprisonment term for which a migrant could become subject for deportation from five years to one year. IIRIRA also made deportable crimes retroactive without limit, even if legal permanent residents had completed their sentences decades earlier. Moreover, IIRIRA eliminated many administrative procedures by which migrants might contest their deportations (Human Rights Watch 2007). Other measures of the new law that increased deportations included raising the requirement for cancellation of formal removal from “exceptional hardship” to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” expediting the removal without review at ports of entry for migrants attempting entry without proper documentation, and authorizing state and local police to assist federal agents in immigration enforcement in certain situations (Human Rights Watch 2007). In the 1990s, the U.S. Congress also dramatically increased the budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to add 1,000 Border Patrol agents annually to reach a total force of 10,000 agents (Hagan and Rodriguez 2002). A special concern of IIRIRA

enforcement measures became the arrest and mandatory deportation of “criminal aliens,” that is, international migrants who have been convicted of a variety of crimes.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 strengthened the enforcement of IIRIRA and other immigration laws. DHS streamlined immigration and border enforcement functions of the former INS through the organization of agencies to carry out specialized enforcement functions. One new specialized agency that was created is ICE, which has the primary duties of arresting and deporting migrants who violate U.S. immigration laws (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2007), especially in interior areas of the country. ICE aggressively searches for “criminal aliens” in communities, jails and prisons, raids workplaces to apprehend unauthorized migrant workers, pursues migrants who abscond from notices to appear at deportation hearings or who are fugitives of deportation orders, and works with local police taskforces in special enforcement operations, such as arresting international criminal gang members. ICE enforcement activities account for the vast majority of formal removals.

TWO STUDIES OF IIRIRA EFFECTS

In 1997, sociologists at the University of Houston undertook the first of two studies to explore effects of IIRIRA and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), also enacted in 1996, to reform national social welfare policy (Hagan and Rodriguez 2002). The first study started with visits to social service agencies in five selected research communities in Texas--El Paso, Hidalgo, Laredo, Houston, and Fort Worth. In the visits, the researchers sought information from social service providers and community-based organizations concerning their views of the

impacts of IIRIRA and PRWORA on their migrant client populations. In a second phase, the study interviewed 100 households with immigrant members in each of the five research sites to determine the initial impacts of IIRIRA and PRWORA. A third phase of the study, which emerged from comments given in community and household interviews, expanded the research in late 1998 to El Salvador to investigate effects of deportations through a pilot survey of deportees deported to that country (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004).

Based on the results of the pilot survey, a second study of immigration enforcement effects was undertaken in 2002 through a random survey of 300 deported migrants in El Salvador. While El Salvador receives a smaller number of deportees in comparison to Mexico, the arrival of Salvadoran deportees through a single airport where they are given a welcoming reception (*Bienvenido a Casa*) by a consortium of community-based service organizations provided an opportunity to attempt a national random survey of a deportee population. In operation since 1999, the *Bienvenido a Casa* reception program gave arriving deportees information about the conditions they would face in El Salvador and about existing social services to help their reintegration into Salvadoran society. *Bienvenido a Casa* program workers also used the receptions to interview deportees regarding their socio-demographic characteristics, migration experiences, reasons for deportation, as well as their future contact information in El Salvador. When Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a member of the consortium, announced in 2002 that it planned to contact deportees on the *Bienvenido a Casa* in-take list to invite them to meetings across the country to discuss job training, the University of Houston researchers asked CRS to interview deportees attending the meetings through systematic random sampling using the lists of deportees who attended the meetings.

Meeting organizers were asked to strive for a sample of 300 deportees. The research instrument was prepared in Houston and taken to El Salvador where CRS staff was trained for its implementation. Questions in the instrument concerned the migration experiences to the United States, work conditions in the United States, family characteristics in the United States and in El Salvador, conditions during apprehension, detention and deportation, and economic conditions and plans after being deported back to El Salvador.

EFFECTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF IIRIRA IN FIVE COMMUNITIES

The household surveys in the five selected research communities in 1997 generally found anxiety and stress among respondents, but with variations across the research sites and with differences regarding the impacts of IIRIRA and PRWORA (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004). Overall, 16.5 percent of the 510 respondents reported that Border Patrol or other INS agents had stopped and questioned them regarding their citizenship status. Thirty-nine percent of those questioned were arrested for an immigration violation. About two-thirds of the respondents who stated that INS agents had questioned them or a household member lived in one of the three border research sites of Hidalgo, Laredo, and El Paso (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004). This finding corresponds with the increase of the Border Patrol force in the border region. In the El Paso research site, the increased visibility of Border Patrol agents was also associated with Operation Hold the Line, which created a human wall of Border Patrol agents at the El Paso borderline to deter unauthorized crossings. In the Hidalgo research site, which is also on the borderline, close to two-thirds of the respondents reported a greater visibility of Border Patrol agents in their neighborhoods, but the respondents did not report having problems with the agents.

In the three border research sites, respondents reported an increased cooperation between INS agents and local police. Border Patrol and local police occasionally patrolled together in the neighborhoods of the border sites.

While some respondents reported a sense of fear or vulnerability due to a greater visibility of INS agents, the greater concern was the new pressure created by PRWORA, which initially excluded legal immigrants from most public welfare benefits (but which were partially restored later for pre-1996 immigrants under certain conditions) (Hagan and Rodriguez 2002). In all the research sites, respondents who were not U.S. citizens expressed interest in naturalizing in order to enhance their U.S. status, and, for some, in order to facilitate the legal immigration of relatives.

Interviews in the larger communities of the five research sites found mixed reactions to the increased immigration enforcement. Across all the research sites, social service providers expressed concern and that increased enforcement would frighten away immigrants who were eligible to receive benefits or have their benefits restored under a new government measure. Public health providers were concerned that increased enforcement would make unauthorized immigrants reluctant to go to public health clinics to have their children immunized or to receive maternal and child health services (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004).

Educators reported mix reactions by families of students to the heightened immigration enforcement. In the Fort Worth and El Paso research sites, school administrators reported enrollment declines in some district schools that they believed were due to new immigration enforcement measures (but the Fort Worth district also experienced increased enrollment in other schools). In El Paso, student enrollment

decline had started with the implementation of Operation Hold the Line in 1992. In the Hidalgo research site, the research found an enrollment increase in one low-income school district, which a school administrator attributed to schools becoming the main source of food (from free meals programs) for children in families dropped from food stamps coverage by PRWORA. In the Houston site, an administrator of a school in an immigrant neighborhood blamed fear among unauthorized immigrant families of heightened immigration enforcement for the drop in parent attendance at school meetings (Hagan and Rodriguez 2002).

In all the research sites, legal offices or community organizations reacted to the stringent measures of new immigration enforcement by organizing information sessions, English classes, and naturalization training for immigrants.

Compared to social service providers and educators, local business owners that catered to the growing INS personnel force expressed positive attitudes towards the increase in immigration enforcement at the research sites. Owners of barber shops, motels, restaurants, and auto repair shops (which worked on Border Patrol vehicles) viewed increased enforcement as contributing to the local economy and keeping crime under control. Some other business owners worried, however, that the increased Border Patrol presence would drive away needed cheap labor or would cause migrants who could not find jobs to turn to crime (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004).

In the three border research sites, the Border Patrol made a conscious effort to maintain a positive image. While in decades earlier, Border Patrol agents (mostly all white males) would patrol Mexican American communities on the border with little concern for local sensitivities, by the late twentieth century this started to change as

Mexican Americans developed political power. The Border Patrol undertook several activities to project an identity as community members. In addition to joining patrols with local police, in some border communities the Border Patrol sponsored youth activities and selected a Border Patrol student of the month or honor student in local schools. In community forums, Border Patrol officials declared their identities with local communities, especially since these were sources of Border Patrol recruits (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004).

A survey conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in late 2007 found that concerns over immigration enforcement expressed by some respondents in the five research sites had become generalized among Latinas and Latinos across the country. The national Pew survey found that a majority of Hispanics (53 percent) worried “a lot” or “some” that they or a family member or a close friend could be deported (Pew Hispanic Center 2007). Moreover, Hispanic attitudes concerning specific enforcement measures reflected more concern than the attitudes of non-Hispanics. While 75 percent of Hispanics in the survey disapproved of workplace raids, 42 percent of non-Hispanics disapproved of this measure, and while 79 percent of Hispanics disapproved of local police taking an active role in immigration enforcement, 49 percent of non-Hispanics disapproved of this measure (Pew Hispanic Center 2007).

As reflected by the Pew survey, in the first decade of the twenty-first century immigration issues became more localized as some state and local governments passed measures to permit local police participation in immigration enforcement or to criminalize the hiring of unauthorized migrant workers, and in some cases to criminalize the renting of housing to these migrants as well. These developments and the decision of

the federal government to send “no-match” letters to employers created a new pressure for unauthorized migrant workers. Under the “no-match rule,” employers are given 90 days to check employee documents and dismiss workers for whom names and Social Security numbers do not match the information found in government records.

The first decade of the twenty-first century also saw the expansion of the government policy of detaining migrants in non-federal detention facilities. AEDPA, IIRIRA and other administrative policies requiring mandatory detention for various categories of migrants increased the daily-detained migrant population beyond the bed capacity of federal detention centers. Before the enactment of strict immigration enforcement, the bed capacity stood at 7,500 beds in 1994. In the first decade of the 2000s, however, the bed capacity approached 20,000 beds, the majority of which were provided by local jails and private corporations (Human Rights Watch 1998; Congressional Research Service 2006). Within one and a half years after the passage of IIRIRA, the INS had contracts with 1,041 local jails across the country to hold migrants, and by the mid-first decade of the twenty-first century migrants were detained in 325 detention centers, which included 16 federal detention centers, half of which were operated by two private corporations (Human Rights Watch 1998; Kolodner 2006).

County governments have become new providers of migrant detention, but not without risk and controversy. After building a 3,000-bed prison and detention facility in the late 1990s, Reeves County in rural western Texas almost suffered a foreclosure of the facility when DHS failed to provide migrant detainees to fill the 1,000-bed wing of the facility reserved for migrants (Corporate Research Project 2004). The intercession by a private detention corporation saved the county from suffering a foreclosure of the facility

by helping to gain a new financial arrangement with Wall Street investors and a new detention contract with DHS and the Arizona prison system. Willacy County in rural southern Texas, experienced controversy among county officials when county commissioners rushed through a short-term bond to build a 2,000 immigrant detention facility. The facility was completed in the summer of 2007, and is managed by a private management corporation. Immigrant detention has become a \$1 billion industry, and the value of private detention firm shares is rising in stock markets (Kolodner 2006).

Pilot Survey of Deportees

When household surveys were implemented in five communities in 1997, the project researchers did not anticipate the dramatic impact that IIRIRA soon had on deportations; consequently, the research instrument did not specifically ask about deportations beyond a couple of probing questions. Comments made by persons in community organizations and by household members, however, indicated that detention and deportation issues were affecting the research sites. To explore how deportations affected the migrant population, the project implemented the pilot study to interview deportees in El Salvador in the fall of 1998.

The pilot study conducted a non-random survey of 211 deportees in El Salvador. Survey results found that 113 deportees in the sample had lived in the United States for three years or less, and 98 deportees had lived in the United States for more than three years. To demonstrate the impacts that intensified enforcement was having on the more settled migrant population, table 1 summarizes findings from the latter category. While almost 60 percent of the subsample of 98 deportees had lived as unauthorized migrants in the United States, over one-fifth (22.4 percent) had been legal permanent residents.

Moreover, 40.8 percent of the subsample had been arrested by local police in the United States for criminal violations, which subsequently led to deportations.

A majority of the subsample of 98 deportees was married, and a large majority of the married deportees had spouses living in the United States. In addition, about half of the deportees reported having children living in the United States. Almost half (46.9 percent) of the subsample planned to re-migrate to the United States.

Findings of the pilot study suggested that deportations were affecting deep layers of the migrant population, and not just recently arrived unauthorized migrants. In order to study these impacts further, the random survey of Salvadoran deportees was undertaken in the summer of 2002.

RANDOM SURVEY OF SALVADORAN DEPORTEES

The survey of 300 deportees in El Salvador enabled comparisons among layers of deportees that are differentiated by the length of time spent living in the United States prior to deportation. Five layers of time are used for the findings presented in tables 2 through 4: lived in the United States for more than 0 years, for more than 1 year, for more than 3 years for more than 5 years, and for more than 10 years.

As table 2 indicates, deportees tend to be overwhelmingly males, although this will change as the U.S. government makes arrangements to increase the detention capacity for women and families. The strategic plan of the Endgame is to deport “all removable aliens.” While the total sample of 300 deportees had a median age of 29, the median ages of the different temporal categories of deportees gets older as the length of time spent in the United State increases, since more recently arrived migrants tend to be younger. Moreover, as table 2 indicates, the proportion of authorized migrants increases

as the time spent living in the United States increases. One reason is that the longer migrants reside in the United States the more opportunities they have to gain legal status, such as by marrying a legally resident spouse (although this does not insure legalization of their immigration status). Another reason is that many of the most recently arrived migrants from El Salvador tend to have unauthorized status.

[table 2 about here]

Deportee educational levels also increase with time spent in the United States. Some or many of the deportees with longer residences in the United States attended U.S. school systems, which provide more years of compulsory education than schools in many Central American areas. Not surprisingly, English-speaking skill increases with time spent in the United States. Time spent in the host society normally affects acculturation and assimilation; consequently, longer-term migrants in the United States are likely to acquire greater English skills, especially if they reside outside migrant enclaves. This is true for the second- and third-generations of immigrants as well (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

The economic indicators in table 2 of employment status prior to deportation, years worked, and weekly income indicate that time spent in the United States is strongly associated with economic incorporation. Locating a job, participating in the labor force, and undergoing income mobility transpire across time. Nonetheless, there appears to be some degree of compression in the migrant labor force as the increased proportions in the two highest income categories are not dramatic (although there are substantial missing values across all temporal layers).

The changing measures of family indicators across the migrant temporal layers in table 3 are consistent with family changes across time. Given that recent migrants generally tend to be younger, and that marriage increases with age in the earlier years, a greater percentage of migrants with greater time spans in the United States tend to be married. It is not surprising that migrants with longer spans in the United States tend to have a greater percentage of spouses in the United States, as presumably many of these migrants have located their family formation in the country where they are settled. The finding that the proportions of spouses with legal status (citizen, green card, etc.) increases for migrants with longer time spans in the United States suggests a gradual transition to legal status across time among migrants, as migrant spouses regularize their status or as migrants marry U.S.-born spouses. As a reflection of an age function, migrants with longer spans in the United States tend to have children at a higher proportion than the most recent (and younger) migrants. Moreover, migrants who have a longer span in the United States are more likely to have more children in the United States as a function of location.

[table 3 about here]

Table 4 indicators of conditions associated with deportation show effects of changing immigration enforcement since the mid-1990s. More recent deportees are more likely to be arrested by federal agents (Border Patrol) because they are more likely to be arrested for illegal migrant status, while longer-term migrants are more likely to be arrested by local police for committing a criminal violation, and subsequently taken into custody by federal agents for deportation proceedings. Across the layers of time spent living in the United States, the percent of migrants who had been deported previously

remains fairly similar, at close to 25 percent. This suggests that the risk and vulnerability of unauthorized status remains a constant throughout an unauthorized migrant career. As table 4 indicates, the proportion of deportees planning to re-migrate to the United States increases across the layers of time spent living in the United States.

[table 4]

Table 5 presents a univariate odds-ratio analysis of factors affecting the plan to re-migrate to the United States. Several factors were considered in the investigation of what conditions and characteristics increase the likelihood that a deportee will plan to re-migrate. These factors were age at interview, having more than 8 years of schooling, being employed before deportation, having U.S. work authorization prior to deportation, having been deported more than once, having remitted money to family or others in El Salvador prior to deportation, having a spouse or children living in the United States, and having a parent living in the United States (Eschbach 2007). As table 4 indicates, the conditions that have statistically significant odds ratios of a likelihood to plan to re-migrate are having an age younger than 42 years, having a spouse living in the United States, and having a child or children under the age of 18 living in the United States. In an unreported multivariate logistic regression model, having been deported more than one time previously was also found to have a statistically significant odds ratio of being likely to plan to re-migrate (Eschbach 2007).

[table 5 about here]

DISCUSSION

The research findings described above indicate that new immigration enforcement measures implemented since the 1990s are having significant effects on the international

migrant population in the United States. As stated above, the early fears of detention and deportation reported in the surveys of community organizations and households in five Texas communities in the late 1990s have now become generalized in the population of Latinas and Latinos living in the United States. Even non-migrant Latinas and Latinos report fear that someone they know may be deported from the country (Pew Hispanic Center 2007). There are real reasons for this widespread fear, since the deportation of international migrants, which overwhelmingly affects Latin American migrants, has increased by a multiple of four since the mid-1990s and since the U.S. government is poised to increase the massive detention and deportation of international migrants through their Endgame strategic plan.

Findings of the survey of 300 Salvadoran deportees indicate that the mass removal of Latina and Latino international migrants is affecting deep layers of the Latin American origin population in the United States. The massive forced repatriation of Latin American migrants is removing layers of migrants who have become established residents of the United States after more than three, five and ten years of living in the country. While ICE, DRO and other U.S. immigration enforcement agencies rationalize the massive removal of migrants in terms of ridding the country of a dangerous “criminal aliens,” many of the deported migrants completed their sentences years ago and returned to their U.S. communities as productive members. The spirit and regulations of the rigid measures for migrant removal are significantly at odds with human rights standards that other countries have adopted (Human Rights Watch 1998).

Findings listed in table 2 indicate that deportations are removing key resources for the stability of migrant communities and households. Deportations (and a ban on future

re-migration to the United States) of migrants who have been in the United States for five years or more, for example, removes persons with resources to support the social incorporation of communities and family households. As table 2 shows, these resources include a greater probability of having authorized status, having higher levels of education, being fluent in English, being employed, having durability in the labor force, and having higher levels of income. An international migrant population that originates from lower socioeconomic status cannot afford to lose these resources in the process of social incorporation into U.S. society without incurring major disadvantages.

Table 3 indicates how deportations remove critical resources for family household stability. The majority of deportees are being removed from family units in which spouses are very likely to have legal status and in which children younger than 18 are present and are likely U.S. citizens. Removing a migrant from these family conditions can have devastating effects in terms of the loss of income and parental authority to assist in the socialization of children. The transmission of social knowledge and skills in social life has an intergenerational component that when absent or disrupted can have maladaptive consequences (Mannheim 1993). In addition to the fragmentation of family units, the physical removal of family members by force, especially parents, can have long-lasting traumatic effects on children (Capps, Casteñeda, Chaudry and Santos 2007).

From the perspective of external resources for development in foreign communities of origin, it is worth considering the latent outcomes that deportations have on remittances. Of the 105 deportees in the survey who responded to the question of remittance, 60.5 percent reported sending money to their families or others in El Salvador. The median amount was \$200 per month. While remittances have no direct

relation to immigration enforcement, their elimination through deportations can result in the disappearance of economic safety nets in foreign communities of origin, which in turn results in the very conditions that promoted unauthorized economic migration in the first place. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (2008), in 2006 El Salvador received \$3.3 billion in remittances from migrants, which recipients used mainly to cover basic household needs.

Table 1 indicates that new policies promoting collaboration between federal and local police forces in immigration enforcement are having significant effects. According to the findings, migrants who spend more time in the United States are more likely to be arrested by local police (and subsequently deported). The arrest by local police results from criminal violations: 75.8 percent of the migrants arrested by local police were arrested for a criminal violation. Prior to the mid-1990s, many migrants arrested by local police returned to their U.S. homes after serving sentences or otherwise dealing with the criminal justice system. Under new enforcement measures since the 1990s, many of these migrants now are interviewed and deported after completing sentences.

In contradiction to the Endgame mission of removing all “removable aliens” from the United States, many deported migrants return to the United States. As table 3 shows, in all the temporal layers of time spent in the United States, about one fourth of the deportees had been deported previously, and across all the layers a majority of the deportees planned to re-migrate to the United States. Deportees follow through in their plans to re-migrate. In 2005, 18,203 migrants were deported for having returned to the United States after having been deported and banned earlier (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, table 40). The number of deportees who return annually to the

United States without being apprehended is likely greater and will increase as the number of deportations increase.

Deportations have created a new pattern of migration, that is, the migration of deported migrant whose return to the United States is principally associated with family conditions. This migration pattern may be more difficult to deter than economic migration because the compulsion to migrate lies in the deep emotional bonds of family primary relationships (Cooley 1962).

CONCLUSION

New immigration control policies implemented since the mid-1990s have created a major social dimension affecting the settlement and lives of international migrants in the United States. These policies, particularly IIRIRA measures, have widespread impacts because their reach affects the legally resident international migrant population and U.S.-born residents who live in households with international migrants.

In the absence of a comprehensive immigration law to accommodate the large volume of international migrant workers entering the country without authorization, the form of regulation that operates by default are coercive policies to arrest and remove the unauthorized migrant streams. The research described in this paper indicates that this coercive regulation is carried out at great costs to migrant families and communities. Moreover, while the Endgame of the U.S. government has succeeded in deporting massive numbers of migrants annually, it as also produced a human boomerang in the annual unauthorized re-immigration of thousands of formally deported migrants. The only clear winners in the Endgame are the private detention firms, which are paid millions of dollars by the federal government to detain migrants.

References

- Capps, Randy, Rosa Maria Castañeda, Ajay Chaudry, and Robert Santos. 2007. *Paying the Price: The Impact of Immigration Raids on America's Children*. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute. (Report prepared for the National Council of La Raza.)
- Congressional Research Service. 2004. "Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues." April 28. Washington, D.C.: United States Congress. On-line report: <http://openocrs.com/>
- Congressional Research Service. 2006. "Immigration Enforcement Within the United States." April 6. Washington, D.C.: United States Congress. On-line report: <http://openocrs.com/>
- Cooley, Charles Horton. 1962. *Social Organization*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Corporate Research Project. 2004. Public Bonds: Reeves County Detention Center. Onb-line report: <http://www.publicbonds.org/controversies/reeves.htm>
- Eschbach, Karl. 2007. Unpublished multivariate regression table. San Antonio: The University of Texas at San Antonio.
- Hagan, Jacqueline, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2002. "Resurrecting Exclusion: The Effects of 1996 Immigration Reform on Families and Communities in Texas, Mexico and El Salvador." Pp. 190-201 in Marcelo Suarez-Orozco and Mariela Paez (eds.) *Latinos: Remaking America*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Hagan, Jacqueline, Karl Eschbach, and Nestor Rodriguez. Forthcoming. "U.S. Deportation Policy, Family Separation, and Circular Migration." *International Migration Review*.

- Human Rights Watch. 1998. *Locked Away: Immigration Detainees in Jail in the United States*. Vol. 10, no. 1 (September 1). On-line report: <http://www.hrw.org/>
- Human Rights Watch. 2007. *Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants Harmed by United States Deportation Policy*. Vol. 19, No. 3(G) (July). On-line report: <http://www.hrw.org/>
- Inter-American Development Bank. 2008. "El Salvador and Remittances." January 10. On-line report: http://www.iadb.org/mif/remittances/lac/remesas_es.cfm
- Kolodner, Meredith. 2006. "Immigration Enforcement Benefits Prison Firms." *New York Times*, July 19.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1993. "The Problem of Generations." Pp. 351-398 in Kurt H. Wolff (ed.), *From Karl Mannheim*, 2nd edition. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Office of Immigration Statistics. 2006. *Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2005. Annual Report*. November. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. On-line report.
- Pew Hispanic Center. 2007. "2007 National Survey of Latinos: As Illegal Immigration Issue Heats Up, Hispanics Feel a Chill." December 19. Washington, D.C. On-line report: <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/84.pdf>
- Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. 2006. *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rodriguez, Nestor, and Jacqueline Hagan. 2004. "Fractured Families and Communities: Effects of Immigration Reform in Texas, Mexico, and El Salvador." *Latino Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3 (December): 328-351.
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2006. *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2005*.

Washington, D.C.: Office of Immigration Statistics.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2003. *Endgame: Office of Detention and Removal Strategic Plan, 2003-2012. Detention and Removal Strategy for a Secure Homeland*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. On-line report.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2007. *ICE: Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Report. Protecting National Security and Upholding Public Safety*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. On-line report: www.ice.gov