

Beyond the Mexican Case: A Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Analysis of Central American Migration to the United States

> Jack DeWaard & Keuntae Kim University of Wisconsin Madison



PROIECT DESCRIPTION

The aim of this paper is to both test and extend the existing body of theoretical and empirical work on the determinants of international migration. About a decade has passed since Massey and Espinosa's (1997) detailed account of Mexico-U.S. migration, wherein they found support for social capital formation, human capital formation, and market consolidation in explaining first and subsequent migration from Mexico to the United States. Their work spawned subsequent efforts among scholars to further elucidate the nuances of Mexico-U.S. migration, including the dynamics of origin communities and unique migration streams (Fussell 2004; Lindstrom and Lauster 2001). While the abundance of scholarship on Mexico-U.S. migration is no doubt impressive, it remains to be seen whether the conclusions that have emerged from these studies can be said to hold beyond the Mexico-U.S. case

Using data from the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP), we analyze first migration to the United States from Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua over the period 1965-2000, Like Massey and Espinosa (1997), we employ a rich set of theoretical predictors and multinomial discrete time event history models. We likewise extend the work of Massey and Espinosa (1997) in two respects. First, we do not restrict our sample to men; our doing so represents our attempt to highlight international migration as a highly gendered process (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). Second, we provide an explicit treatment of duration dependence and show that researchers must be duly concerned with both the changes in their predictors and the changes in the effects of their predictors over time. In our final models, we provide an example that nicely illustrates this distinction.





RESEARCH OUESTIONS

- 1. What's driving Central American migration to the United States?
- 2. Are the same factors driving Central American Migration to the United States that Massey and Espinosa found to be driving Mexico-U.S. migration, namely - social capital formation, human capital formation, and market consolidation?
- 3. Where and how does gender fit in? Is there a constant gender effect over time? Or does impact of gender vary by, say, the legal status of the migrant (i.e., undocumented or documented)?
- 4. How do the relevant driving factors play out with respect to one another and with time? Does it make sense that their effects should be considered constant? Or is their evidence for accelerated and/or diminishing returns?
- 5. The above questions considered, what is "left over" so to speak? Might our residuals be a further indication as to the importance of place when considering the process of international migration?

DATA & METHODS

* Latin American Migration Project (LAMP): http://lamp.opr.princeton.edu

- * 3,681 men and women ages 15+ from Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua between 1965-2000. ** 2,763 males (74.83%) and 918 females (24.94%).
- ** 1,408 (35.51%) Costa Ricans, 508 (10.66%) Guatemalans and 1,765 (53.83%) Nicaraguans. 93,614 person years.
- ** 67,819 (72.13%) male and 25,795 (27.87%) female person years
- ** 35,447 (35.66%) Costa Rican, 12,317 (10.29%) Guatemalan and 45,850 (54.04%) Nicaraguan person years.
- * Outcome variable: Event of first migration to the United States
- ** Competing risks of:
- *** Undocumented migration vs. no migration
- *** Documented migration vs. no migration Undocumented first migration:
- ** Log rank tests reveal:
- *** Statistically significant difference in the baseline hazard functions for men and women.
- *** Statistically significant differences in the baseline hazard functions for Costa Ricans, Guatemalans and Nicaraguans.
- Documented first migration
- ** Log rank tests reveal:
- *** No statistically significant difference in the baseline hazard functions for men and women
- *** Statistically significant differences in the baseline hazard functions for Costa Ricans, Guatemalans and Nicaraguans.
- Method:
- ** Discrete time event history models for competing risks.
- ** Also known as multinomial event history models; proportional odds models.
- ** See Singer and Willet (2003) and Yamaguchi (1991).

	Sex	Sex o
	Country of origin	Cour
	Age 15-49	Betw
	Labor force experience	Num
	Education	Num
	Visa availability	Legal
	Expected wage ratio	Predi
	Real interest rate	Inter
	Foreign liabilities	Rate
	Migrant siblings	Num
	Period 1965-1980	Year
_	*Various interactions (see results from in	nteractiv

KEV MEASURES

of respondent (reference category: female) ntry of origin (reference category: Nicaragua) veen ages 15 & 49 (reference category: 50+) nber of years actual labor force experience ber of years of school completed immigration divided by sum of legal and gross entries licted ratio from data on home & US wages est rate minus inflation rate of change in foreign liabilities of monetary authority nber of siblings with US migration experience 1965-1980 (reference category: 1981-2000) ve models below)

RESULTS: ADDITIVE MODELS

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		
Undocumented Migration	Log Odds	Relative Risk	Log Odds	Relative Sink	Log Odds	Relative Sink	Log Odds	Selative Risk	
Analysis time	0.154 *	1.166	0.246 *	1.279	0.187 *	1.205	0.160 *	1.173	
Analysis time squared	-0.005 *	0.995	-0.004 *	0.996	-0.004 *	0.996	-0.003 *	0.997	
Sex	1.374 *	3.951	1.184 *	3.267	1.124 *	3.078	1.218 *	3.381	
Costa Rára	-0.934 *	0.393	-0.961 *	0.382	-0.543 *	0.581	-0.314	0.731	
Guaternala	0.273 *	1.314	0.282 *	1.326	-0.044	0.957	0.612 *	1.845	
Ages 15-49			0.725 *	2.064	0.942 *	2.564	0.790 *	2.203	
Labor form emperience			-0.114 *	0.892	-0.088 *	0.916	-0.091 *	0.913	
Education			0.013 †	1.013	0.010	1.010	-0.004	0.99	
Visa availability					-2.700 *	0.067	-2.412 *	0.090	
Wage satio							0.148 †	1.160	
Real interst rate							0.000 *	1.000	
Possign liabilities							0.022 *	1.022	
Migrant siblings							0.644 *	1.904	
Constant	-7.777 *		-8.091 *		-6.770 *		-7.607 *		
Documented Migration	Log Odds	Relative Risk	Log Odds	Balative Sink	Log Odds	Belative Sisk	Log Odds	Selative Risk	
Analysis time	0.024 *	1.025	0.102 *	1.108	0.083 *	1.086	0.081 *	1.084	
Analysis time squared	-0.001 †	0.999	-0.001 *	0.999	-0.001 *	0.999	-0.001 *	0.999	
Sex	0.092	1.096	-0.072	0.931	-0.086	0.918	-0.048	0.953	
Costa Rina	0.385 *	1.469	0.310 *	1.363	0.446 *	1.562	-0.022	0.97	
Guaternala	-0.287 +	0.751	-0.155	0.857	-0.287 *	0.750	-0.207 *	0.81	
Agss 15-40			-0.899 *	0.407	-0.837 *	0.433	-0.974 *	0.37	
Labor form experience			-0.075 *	0.927	-0.068 *	0.935	-0.068 *	0.93	
Education			0.070 *	1.073	0.069 *	1.072	0.061 *	1.06	
Visa availability					-0.934 *	0.393	-0.847 *	0.42	
Wage satio							0.207 *	1.23	
Real interst rate							0.000 *	1.00	
Pomign kabilities							0.003	1.00	
Migrant siblings							0.511 *	1.66	
Constant	6.333 *		-5.697 *		-5.184 *		-5.642 *		
Log prædo-klækhood	-14977.40		-14458.33		-14315.44		-13738.26		
Chi Squase	628.05 +		1466.33 *		1751.98 *		2906.44 *		
*p<05;†p<10									

RESULTS: INTERACTIVE MODELS

	M+del 3		Medel 6		Medel 7		Madel 5	
Undocumented Migration	Log Odda	Belative Biok	Log Odda	Selative Fink	Log Odda	Belative Bick	Log Odds	Belative Risk
Analysis tisse	0.171 *	1.186	0.009	1.019	-1.136 *	0.321	-1.180 *	0.30
Analysis time squared.	-0.004 *	0.996	-0.004 *	0.996	-0.005 *	0.997	-0.003 *	0.997
Sex	1.240 *	3.454	1 227 •	3.409	1340 *	3.854	1.340 *	3.81
April 15-49	0.771 -	2.163	0.850 -	2.559	0.895 *	2.447	1.029 *	2.82
Lab-or form emperiersm	-0.092 *	0.913	-0.089 *	0.915	-0.085 *	0.919	-0.073 *	0.934
Education	-0.004	0.996	-0.006	0.995	0.030 *	1:034	0.032 *	1.05
Vice evaluability	-2.524 *	0.090	-2.397 *	0.091	-2.511 *	0.081	-1.611 *	0.20
Wage saliso	0.251 *	1.260	-1.079 *	0.540	-1.542 *	0.261	-0.563 *	0.50
Neal intent rate	0.000 *	1.000	0.000 *	1.000	0.000 *	1.000	0.000 *	1.00
Fomign Labdities	0.021 *	1.021	0.022 *	1.022	0.021 *	1:02:1	0.009 *	1.01
Migrant siblings	0.641 *	1.899	0.632 *	1.991	0.679 *	1.973	0.685 *	1.98
Analysis time * Costa Rev	-0.050 *	0.953	-0.199 *	0.829	0.955 *	2.508	1 074 *	2.92
Analysis tinse * Guatemala	0.052 *	1.032	0.033 *	1.055	1.230 *	3.423	1347 *	3.84
Analysis time * wars ratio			0.052 *	1.053	0.439 *	1.551	0.444 *	1.55
Costa Rica* wage satio			0.631 *	1.079	0.771 *	2.162	0.407 *	1.54
Guatemala * wage ratio			-0.079	0.924	-0.104	0.902	0142	1.15
Analysis time * Costs Rice * wags astio					-0.589 *	0.678	-0.454 *	0.66
Analysis time * Gustemals * wage ratio					-0.411 *	0.663	-0.459 *	0.63
Period 1965-1980							-1.141 *	0.51
Constant	-7.805 *		-4182 *		-3.901 *		-6.359 *	
Documented Migration	Log Odds	Belative Bish	Log Odds	Belative Bisls	Log Odda	Belative Biols	Log Odda	Belative Eich
Analysis time	0.106 *	1.111	0.078 *	1.081	0.267 *	1.306	0.261 *	1.298
Analysis time squared	-0.001 *	0.999	-0.005 *	0.999	-0.001 *	0.999	-0.001 *	0.99
Sex	-0.028	0.972	-0.048	0.955	-0.062	0.940	-0.068	0.95
April 15-49	-1.012 *	0.363	-0.956 *	0.392	-0.952 *	0.386	-0.999 *	0.41
Labor form emperiesre	-0.071 *	0.933	-0.066 *	0.956	-0.067 *	0.935	-0.063 *	0.95
Education	0.059 *	1.061	0.062 *	1.064	0.057 *	1.059	0.055 *	1.05
Vice evaluability	-0.841 *	0.431	-0.956 *	0.400	+0.921 *	0.398	-0.589 *	0.55
Wage ratio	0.311 *	1.365	-0.295 *	0.746	-0.279 †	0.757	-0.079	0.92
Real intent rate	0.000 *	1.000	0.000 *	1 000	0.000 *	1.000	0.000 †	1.00
Fonign labilities	0.002	1.002	0.003	1.003	0.003 †	1.003	0.002	1.00
Mignant silvlings	0.496 *	1.643	0.456 *	1.642	0.407 +	1.629	0.497 *	1.62
Analysis time * Costa Rica	-0.024 *	0.976	-0.068 *	0.955	-0.254 *	0.776	-0.249 *	0.78
Analysis time * Ousternals	-0.017 *	0.963	-0.035 *	0.966	-0.821 *	0.440	-0.841 -	0.45
Analysis tinse * wage catio			0.009 *	1.009	-0.054	0.947	-0.058	0.94
Costa Rice * wage satio			0.358 *	1.431	0.348 *	1.417	0.259 *	1.29
Guatemala * wage ratio			0.065	1.067	0.014	1.014	0.099	1.0%
Analysis tiese * Costa Ree * wage satio					0.064	1.066	0.064	1.06
Analysis time * Gustemala * wage ratio					0.521 *	1.379	0.329 *	1.38
Period 1965-1980							-0.447 *	0.63
					a 4700 m		1 1 2 4	
Constant	-6.105 *		-4020.1		-4.370 *		-3.120 -	
Constant Log prædo-Mekhood	-6.105 *		-13679.50		-13642:30		-13600.19	
Constant Log prærde-Melihood Cie Spuas	-6.105 * -13712.47 2958.00 *		-4.625 * -13679.50 3023.87 *		-13642.30 3098.25 *		-15600.19 5182.55 *	

KEY FINDINGS

- 1. We more or less replicated the work of Massey and Espinosa (1997) in our additive models, but of course applied to the countries of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In Model 4, for instance, the signs for each of the theoretical predictors - expected wage ratio, real interest rate, foreign liabilities, and migrant siblings - are all significant and in the expected direction.
- 2. Turning to our interactive models, we begin to see the picture get considerably more complicated. The interactions between analysis time and each country of origin dummy are significant. This is as it should be
- 3. We then experiment with the expected wave ratio. Massey and Espinosa (1997) picked up a weak positive effect at best. However, two- and three-way interaction terms show that the expected wage ratio continues to be at play and, moreover, that the effects differ by undocumented and documented migration. With respect to the former, we see that the effect of the expected wage ratio has declined over time in both Costa Rica and Guatemala relative to Nicaragua. The opposite is the case where documented migration is concerned.
- 5. Finally, Model 8 brings in a simple period effect, something we discussion in the conclusion of this poster

PREDICTED HAZARDS



DISCUSSION, CHALLENGES & NEXT STEPS

- 1. The period effect in Model 8 seemingly warns us that our models are incomplete. This simple period effect is intended to be a rough catch for the periods of war and unrest in both Guatemala and Nicaragua. The Guatemalan Civil War ran from 1960-1996. Nicaragua experienced profound political changes with the Sandinista Revolution which arguably reached its apex in 1979.
- 2. As a methodological issue, the models developed in this poster are premised on a non-traditional risk set. While we "start the clock" in 1965 for those ages 15 or older, we also allow additional persons to enter the risk set when they turn 15. While the notion of both increments and decrements is more realistic, it is also more difficult to model, especially that of duration dependence.